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My dissertation is a series of papers examining the link between the credit market accessibility
(CMA) and individual labor market decisions.
The first chapter analyzes a decline in the ability to obtain financing as a potential explanation
for the observed decrease in the U.S. self-employment. The shrinking of the U.S. bank branch
network since 2010 and the increased average borrower-lender distance reduce the accessibility of
credit institutions for borrowers. To evaluate the impact of the CMA on entry into self-employment,
I disaggregate the self-employed into two categories: entrepreneurs whose businesses depend on
business loans (Type-1) and other self-employed (Type-2). Using a novel data source (the Commu-
nity Advantage Panel Survey database), I find that the proximity of credit market institutions has
heterogeneous effects on transition to self-employment. An improvement in the CMA increases
the likelihood of transition to Type-1 self-employment. But for the Type-2 self-employed, the
effect is the opposite: the probability of transition to Type-2 self-employment decreases and self-
employed workers of this type are more likely to switch to paid employment to be able to receive
non-business related loans. The chapter discusses the implications of these results for different
policies.
The second chapter investigates the effects of the credit market development on the labor mo-
bility between the informal and formal labor sectors. In the case of Russia, due to the absence
of a credit score system, a formal lender may set a credit limit based on the verified amount of
income. To get a loan, an informal worker must first formalize his or her income (switch to a
formal job), and then apply for a loan. To show this mechanism, the RLMS data was utilized,
and the empirical method is the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment. The empirical
results show that a relaxation of credit constraints increases the probability of transition from an
iii
informal to a formal job, and improved CMA (by one standard deviation) increases the chances of
informal sector workers to formalize by 5.4 ppt. These results are robust in different specifications
of the model. Policy simulations show strong support for a reduction in informal employment in
response to better CMA in credit-constrained communities.
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CHAPTER 1
KNOCKIN’ ON THE BANK’S DOOR: WHY IS SELF-EMPLOYMENT GOING DOWN?
1.1 Introduction
The self-employed sector in the U.S. has lost almost 1 million workers since 19941 (see Figure
1.1). The share of the self-employed in total employment decreased from 12.1 percent in 1994 to
10.1 percent in 2015 (Hipple 2016)2. The literature provides limited reasoning for the decrease
in the number of the self-employed. According to Hipple (2016), the decline in self-employment
may be associated with a decline in agricultural employment. Another reason for this decline is
documented by Schweitzer and Shane (2016). The authors find that business cycles affect transi-
tions in and out of self-employment3, while the recent fall in the aggregate demand explains the
exit from entrepreneurship. This paper focuses on the decline in the ability to obtain financing as
another potential explanation for the observed trends in self-employment.
In recent years, two factors may have contributed to the lower credit market accessibility
(CMA) for the self-employed. The de-liberalization of the financial system during the Great Re-
cession resulted in enhanced regulatory scrutiny and tighter collateral requirements for borrowers
1 The number is reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as the number of unincorporated self-
employed persons. The definition of self-employed individuals also comes from BLS. Self-employed people are those
who work for profit or fees in their own business, profession, trade, or farm, including those who intended to earn
a profit but whose business produced no profit or a loss. Unless otherwise specified, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) estimates of the self-employed published by BLS reflect only people whose businesses are unincorporated. BLS
classifies the incorporated self-employed as wage and salary workers, because the incorporated self-employed are paid
employees of their corporations.
2 From 1994 to 2015, the unincorporated self-employment rate fell from 8.7 percent to 6.4 percent. From 1994
to 1999, the share of total employment made up of the incorporated self-employed ranged from 3.2 percent to 3.5
percent. Over the 2000-08 period, the incorporated self-employment rate rose from 3.3 percent to 4.0 percent. The
rate then edged down to 3.7 percent in 2010 and remained at that level over the 2011-15 period (see Figure 1.2).
3 Beckhusen (2014) also shows that transitions from self-employment to wage employment increased in the post-
recession months.
(Wiersch and Shane 2013). But the recovery of the financial system and the easing of require-
ments for borrowers did not lead to the pre-crisis levels of self-employment. The other factor is
the shrinking of the U.S. bank branch network since 2010 and, as a consequence, the increased
average borrower-lender distance (see Figure 1.3) (Nguyen 2019). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (FDIC) claims that at least 80 percent of branch closings should not have any mean-
ingful impact on the physical access to banks, as they occur in areas with multiple remaining
branches4 However, the borrowing process for the self-employed is informationally intensive, and
credit approvals primarily rely on soft information about the borrower (DeYoung, Glennon, and
Nigro 2008). In other words, personal presence during a loan transaction can still play an essential
role in obtaining financing.
This study confirms that the CMA declined substantially in the U.S. between 2007 and 2014
(see Figure 1.4). In this context, the accessibility is proxied by the average borrower-lender dis-
tance, the number of nearby branches, and the number of bank employees in the county of resi-
dence. However, the effect of the reduced physical CMA on self-employment rates is ambiguous.
On the one hand, the relationship between the CMA and the probability of being self-employed
could be positive. A few previous studies find that a shorter lender-borrower distance increases
business lending (Nguyen (2019); Degryse and Ongena (2005)), which may positively influence
the number of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, studies from countries with a large informal sec-
tor show that new bank openings create incentives for individuals working in the informal sector
to switch to jobs with verifiable income in order to be eligible for loans and thus transfer to paid
employment (Malkova et al. 2019). In the case of the U.S., a shorter borrower-lender distance may
create incentives for self-employed workers with restricted access to the credit market5 to switch
4 Branch closings are heavily regulated by the FDIC (https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
rules/5000-3830.html). 4 Before closing a branch, banks must provide detailed research and statistics about
the effect of the closure on the local economy, and clients must receive a notice 90 days prior to the branch closing in
a given area.
5 For example, Johnson (2016) states that due to the unstable, and sometimes informal, nature of business income
of the self-employed, the business income is often not counted in full when a self-employed person applies for a
mortgage and lenders calculate the debt-to-income ratio. The author shows that the Ability-to-Repay rule significantly
restricts self-employed households’ access to mortgage credit. By restricting access to credit, verified debt-to-income
requirements lead to a reduction in self-employment and small business employment.
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to paid employment to be able to use credit products. In other words, the effect of the CMA on
transition to self-employment is likely to be heterogeneous, which is the focus of this study.
The study utilizes several sources of U.S. data between 2003 and 2014. The main database is
the Community Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS)6 database. The benefit of using this database is
the opportunity to identify geographical distances between each individual and all banks within
the state. The location of banks is taken from the FDIC Summary of Deposits (SOD) data7. To
diminish the effect of the unobservable local economic conditions that are correlated with the credit
supply, I also use county and tract-level control variables from the American Community Survey
(ACS).
The paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part, I discuss testable implications from an
intuitive theoretical model (a three-sector Roy model) that shows the effect of the CMA on the
labor mobility among three labor states: two types of self-employment (SE) and paid employment
(wage employment). The theoretical model is based on the works by Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
and Levine and Rubinstein (2018). To show the heterogeneous effects of the CMA on decisions
to become self-employed, I divide self-employed workers into two types. The first one (Type-1
self-employed) includes entrepreneurs, owners of firms that demand physical capital and business
loans8. The second one (Type-2 self-employed) comprises non-entrepreneurs and owners of com-
panies without business loans; in other words, the agent uses own initial wealth to start a business. 9
In the theoretical model, agents enter self-employment (Type-1 and Type-2) based on their compar-
ative advantage that depends on their abilities and the amount of available assets. Individuals face
6 CAPS comprises 11 years of a panel survey of approximately 5,000 low- and moderate-income homeowners and
renters during the period of 2003-2014. The data collection has been conducted by the UNC Center for Community
Capital with generous funding from the Ford Foundation.
7 FDIC SOD provides an annual enumeration of all branches belonging to FDIC-insured institutions. As of Septem-
ber 2019, the FDIC provided deposit insurance at 5,256 institutions. The FDIC insures deposits in member banks up
to US$250,000 per ownership category.
8 Among the Type-1 self-employed, mention may be made of computer programmers, lawyers, doctors, real estate
managers, etc.
9 Examples of the Type-2 self-employed are tutors, housekeeping cleaners, lawn service workers, grounds mainte-
nance workers, etc.
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borrowing costs including both interest costs and non-interest costs (the time costs of arranging a
loan and any monetary initiation costs). The comparative static shows that lower non-interest costs
of borrowing (better CMA) increase the probability of being Type-1 self-employed, decrease the
probability of being Type-2 self-employed, and increase the probability of transition from Type-2
self-employment to paid employment.
The second part of the paper is an empirical analysis that aims to estimate the impact of the
CMA on transitions in and out of self-employment. The CMA is measured as an index based
on a combination of the following variables: the average distance from an individual to 10 near-
est banks, the number of banks and branches within 5 miles from the individual, and the number
of bank workers per 1,000 population at the county level. The model used for this analysis is a
dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with correlated random effects. The empirical
challenge is that banks choose where to locate branches depending on the local economic con-
ditions that are correlated with the number of the self-employed in a given area. I use several
approaches to identify the causal effect of the CMA on decisions to become self-employed. First,
I control for the set of variables that proxy the local economic conditions at the county level: the
number of business establishments, the unemployment rate, the share of the population with pro-
fessional, scientific, management and administrative education. Second, I include in the model
the within-means of CMA characteristics that accounts for the endogeneity of the CMA with re-
gards to unobserved factors like the fixed-effect model. In addition, I estimate the model using
the exposure to post-merger consolidation of banks at the Census tract level as an instrument for
CMA changes (Nguyen (2019); Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006)). In this paper, I consider merg-
ers of large banks, defined as mergers where both banks held at least US$1 billion in pre-merger
assets. The average Census tract is 1.5 square miles, and the decision of large banks to merge is
plausibly exogenous to the local economic conditions in a Census tract where both banks have a
branch. The merger-induced consolidation decreases competition between banks at the tract level,
which may be followed by a branch closure (Nguyen (2019)) and an increase in the borrower-
lender distance, a decrease in the number of branch employees and a decline in the local CMA.
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The empirical analysis shows heterogeneous effects of the CMA on transitions in and out of self-
employment depending on the type of self-employed workers. For the Type-1 self-employed, an
improvement of the CMA increases the probability of transition in self-employment. While for the
Type-2 self-employed, an improvement of the CMA increases the probability of transition out of
self-employment.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper connects two strands of literature. The first one examines how a decision to be-
come an entrepreneur is associated with access to capital, wealth, and collateral constraints. There
is an extensive literature focusing on the positive correlation between housing wealth and en-
trepreneurial activities (Fan and White (2003), Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012), Fort, Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, and Miranda (2013), Corradin and Popov (2015)). The literature shows that credit con-
straints at the household level matter for the creation of new businesses (Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006)). Previous work has also found that a bank loan is an essential source of financing for small
businesses (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Bates and Robb (2013), Fracassi, Garmaise, Kogan, and
Natividad (2013)) and that entrepreneurs often have to provide personal guarantees when they
obtain financing (Berger and Udell (1998); Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2014)).
Herkenhoff, Phillips, and Cohen-Cole (2016) examine how the access to consumer credit im-
pacts employment prospects, earnings, and entrepreneurship. To isolate the causal effect of credit
on labor market outcomes, authors use bankruptcy flag removals10 to separate a sizable discrete
increase in credit access. Authors show that following the flag removal there is: (a) an increased
flow rate into self-employment, (b) disproportionate borrowing by new self-employed entrants rel-
ative to other job transitioners, (c) an increased likelihood of starting an employer business, (d)
an increase in startups entering capital intensive and external finance intensive industries, and (e)
10 A bankruptcy filing raises a red flag to potential lenders and will affect future lending opportunities. It is likely to
prevent an individual from obtaining credit for a considerable period of time after filing. Even when a debtor is able to
obtain credit, the associated interest rate will be exorbitant. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a bankruptcy filing
can remain on an individual’s credit report for 10 years, and the bankruptcy can be removed from the credit report
after this term.
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disproportionate borrowing by new employer businesses.
The second one is the growing strand of literature that studies the importance of the geograph-
ical distance for bank lending. Two broad channels have been identified in economics literature
for the effects of distance on credit market transactions. First, studies on spatial rationing have
established a correspondence between distance and credit rationing. A closer geographic distance
gives banks privileged access to soft information that facilitates the evaluation of the borrower’s
creditworthiness, thereby permitting them to gain a cost advantage for monitoring over more re-
mote competitors who may not enjoy the same degree of access to such information (Hauswald
and Marquez 2006). The information effect of distance has been shown empirically to facilitate ex
ante screening and ex post monitoring of borrowers in bank lending, giving well-informed banks
a competitive edge and market power (Petersen and Rajan (2002); Brevoort, Wolken, and Holmes
(2010); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004); Sufi (2007); Qian and Strahan (2007)). One benefit
for borrowers located closer to their banks is that, with privileged access to information, inefficient
rationing might be reduced. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a
large bank, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) document that the closer a firm is to its branch office,
the more likely the bank is to offer credit. However, borrowing from closer banks is associated
with, for example, higher interest rates (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). The reason is that bor-
rowers are informationally captured by lenders who have privileged access to soft information to
the extent that such information cannot be credibly communicated to outsiders (Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez 2004).
Second, a shorter lender-borrower distance potentially benefits both parties since it reduces
transaction costs. Examples of such costs for a potential borrower include transportation costs
incurred in the process of applying for a loan and the time and effort spent on either personally
interacting with loan officers or looking for a suitable loan. The reduction in the cost of obtaining
soft information for the lender is another benefit of the shorter distance. In classical models of
location differentiation (Salop 1979), borrowers incur distance-related transportation costs from
visiting their banks while banks price loans uniformly if they cannot observe their borrowers lo-
cations or are prevented from charging different prices to different borrowers (Freixas and Rochet
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2008). However, if banks observe their borrowers locations and offer interest rates based on that
information, they may engage in spatial price discrimination (Lederer and Hurter Jr 1986). For
example, Degryse and Ongena (2005) document that loan rates decrease with the distance between
the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing
banks, suggesting that transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination. Nguyen (2019)
shows that bank branch closings during the 2000s lead to a persistent decline in local small busi-
ness lending. The author asserts that the effect is very localized and dissipates within 6 miles from
the borrower’s location.
This paper contributes to the literature on self-employment in many ways. First, the literature
has not explored the role of the credit market channel in self-employment trends broadly. As it was
mentioned above, the literature discusses the importance of geographical proximity for business
lending, but not in the context of small borrowers such as self-employed persons. In this paper,
I use a novel data source that allows to measure the geographical distance between respondents’
homes and all banks within a state. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the
role of the borrower-lender distance in the decision to become self-employed.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature discussing the diversity of the self-employed. A
growing literature argues that the self-employed should not be considered as an aggregated group
but instead should be split into categories with several different groupings suggested.Levine and
Rubinstein (2017) show that there are crucial differences between unincorporated and incorporated
businesses. Block and Sandner (2009) insist that using push and pull factors, which determine
the selection into self-employment, we can divide the self-employed into two groups: necessity
entrepreneurs who self-employ due to the lack of other options and opportunity entrepreneurs who
seek to bring new ideas to the market or avail themselves of other market advantages. This paper
provides a framework in which individuals are split into two types based on the dependence of
their enterprises on outside financing. The Type-1 self-employed are business owners of firms that
demand physical capital and business loans. The Type-2 self-employed are owners of businesses
that demand less capital and no business loans; in other words, the agent uses own initial wealth to
start a business.
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Third, the paper shows the heterogeneous effect of the CMA on transition to self-employment.
An improvement in the CMA increases the entry into entrepreneurship for those individuals whose
businesses depend on business loans, but it also increases the transition from self-employment to
paid employment if the individual has restricted access to the credit market being self-employed.
1.3 Testable Implications of Theoretical Model
This section describes the highlights of the theoretical model - an intuitive three-sector Roy
model of labor market decisions that (a) captures the essential features of the relationship between
the CMA and the labor mobility among three labor states: two types of self-employment (SE1
and SE2) and paid employment (or salaried employment) (PE), and paid employment (or wage
employment) (PE), and (b) provides testable predictions for the empirical work.
The theoretical model is based on the works by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Levine and
Rubinstein (2018). I divide self-employed workers into two categories. The first one (Type-1 self-
employed) includes owners of businesses that demand entrepreneurial skills, physical capital, and
business loans. Among the Type-1 self-employed, mention may be made of computer program-
mers, lawyers, doctors, real estate managers, etc. In contrast with Levine and Rubinstein (2018),
who state that the second category of the self-employed (Type-2 self-employed) demand none or
little entrepreneurial ability, physical capital and liquidity and are driven mostly by non-pecuniary
benefits of self-employment, I use a different definition for this type of self-employment and model
the Type-2 self-employed as non-entrepreneurs and owners of businesses without business loans;
in other words, either the agent does not have enough collateral to access the credit market, or the
agent can use own initial wealth to start a business (if the business is not capital intensive). Among
the Type-2 self-employed, mention may be made of tutors, babysitters, maintenance workers, etc.
The model is a discrete-time model. In each period, individuals select among the three la-
bor states, where changes between states include known switching costs. Given the information
available at the beginning of each period, individuals choose their labor states, borrowings, and
consumption to maximize the discounted expected utility. Individuals face borrowing costs in-
cluding both interest costs and non-interest costs ψ (the time costs of arranging a loan and any
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monetary initiation costs)11.
The mechanisms for effects of the credit accessibility are through the market for loans. As
is perhaps obvious, improved credit market access makes large-scale, incorporated (Type-1) self-
employment more attractive since such business opportunities often require outside financing. It is
probably not so obvious that improved credit market conditions may also make paid employment
more attractive in comparison to small-scale, informal (Type-2) self-employment. Many lenders
require demonstrable evidence of stable income for consumer loans (e.g., auto, mortgage, credit
cards), and providing such evidence may be easier with paid employment than small-scale, infor-
mal self-employment. Thus, as credit market conditions improve, and individuals are more likely
to seek loans, they may also seek employment that allows them to satisfy the income verifica-
tion conditions for the loans. This phenomenon has been considered previously for developing
countries, but very little study has been done for developed countries
As shown in Malkova (2020), the theoretical model yields testable implications on the effect of
available assets and CMA on labor market states. The key testable implication of the model is that
an improvement of the CMA attributable to a reduction in non-interest costs of borrowing, ψt and
ψt+1, increases the probability of being Type-1 self-employed. The theoretical model also shows
that the likelihood of being Type-1 self-employed increases if the agent has a higher amount of
initial assets, at, or if the bank relaxes collateral requirements, ab.
Corollary 1. A relaxation of credit constraints by reducing non-interest costs of borrowing or
lowering collateral requirements increases the probability of Type-1 self-employment.
The second testable implication is that, if a paid employed worker is allowed to take a one-
period non-business loan (e.g., consumer loan, mortgage), then following a change in non-interest
costs of borrowing, a Type-2 self-employed worker, who initially had no access to the credit mar-
ket, may have incentives to switch to paid employment in order to use credit products. In Malkova
(2020), I show that the probability of switching from Type-2 self-employment in period t to paid
11While it is more natural to look at the CMA through the prism of interest costs of borrowing, I am concerned with
its non-interest rather than interest costs.
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employment in period t+ 1 increases if non-interest costs of borrowing ψt decreases.
∂Pr (SE2t → PEt+1)
∂ψt+1
=
∂Pr (δ(j) = {SE2t, PEt+1})
∂ψt+1
≥ 0
Corollary 2. A relaxation of credit constraints by reducing non-interest costs of borrowing
increases the probability of switching from Type-2 self-employment to paid employment.
1.4 Empirical Model and Identification
1.4.1 The Timeline of the Model
In the empirical model at the beginning of period t, the individual i can be in one of four
employment states j, Yijt: paid-employment (j = 0), Type-1 self-employment (j = 1), Type-2
self-employment (j = 2) or non-employment (j = 3). The individual i also has a set of time-
varying individual characteristics Xit (e.g., age, years of schooling, marital status, the value of
large, durable assets and etc.) and constant individual characteristics Xt (e.g., gender, race and
Hispanic ethnicity). The agent observes the local CMA (the proximity of bank services) in period
t, Zit, that is a set of the following variables12: the average distance from the individual to 10
nearest banks, the number of banks and branches within 5 miles from the individual’s home, and
the number of bank workers per 1,000 population at the county level. The proximity of bank
services may create incentives for the individual i to change the labor state. For example, if the
use of bank services becomes cheaper for the self-employed, a person may make a decision to
become self-employed and open a new business; or if self-employed individual i does not satisfy
bank requirements (e.g., annual income requirements, collateral requirements, credit score, etc.),
the person may make a decision to switch to paid employment to be able to use bank services. At
the beginning of period t+ 1, one would observe a new employment state for individual i.
1.4.2 Dynamic Multinomial Logit Model of Employment
The purpose of this empirical analysis is to show how the proximity of bank services, Zit, with
explanatory variables, Xit and Xi, influences the transition between employment states Yijt →
12 These variables were aggregated into a standardized z-score index. The z-score index is scaled in such a way
that a higher value means better access to the formal credit market (e.g., shorter borrower-lender distance). For the
convenience of interpretation, I also standardize the CMA index with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
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Yijt+1, and I model this transition using the dynamic multinomial logit process with state depen-
dence and unobserved heterogeneity (Prowse 2012).
The probability of employment choice j can be expressed as follows:
Prt+1(j|Xit, Zit, µij) =
exp(Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j +Xitβ3j + µij)∑
j′∈{PE,SE1,SE2,NE} exp(Yij′ tβ1j′ + Zitβ2j′ +Xitβ3j′ + µij′ )
(1.1)
The probability of employment choice j depends on the previous period job type, Yijt, and the
coefficient β1j shows the mobility of individuals across employment states between t and t + 1.
The error term, µij , represents time-variant unobservables. As a proxy for non-interest costs of
borrowing (or the distance measure between), I use the measure of the CMA, Zit. A higher value
of the CMA implies closer proximity to banking services. Since banks perform many functions, I
assume that future unobserved shocks do not influence the availability of banking services and an
individuals job choice in a given year. The measure of the CMA, Zit, is assumed to be exogenous
conditional on the time-constant unobserved effect (µij) time-varying observed factors that may
influence the opening of new bank offices in a given area, but I discuss later some potential solu-
tions to possible violations of this assumption. β2j is another coefficient of interest that shows the
direct effect of the CMA on the type of employment. The agent’s ability, θ, the amount of available
assets, at+1, and the wage of a paid employed worker, wt+1 are included in Xit, and I will discuss
actual measures for these variables later.
The model can be re-written in a more conventional log-odds form by choosing the non-
employed type as the base category:
ln
Pr(Yit+1 = m, m ∈ {PE, SE1, SE2})
Pr(Yit+1 = NE)
= Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j +Xitβ3j + µij (1.2)
In equation 1.2, I allow µij to be correlated across employment states.
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1.4.3 Identification
Several issues arise in the estimation of equation 1.2. The first one is the possible correlation
of the unobserved heterogeneity, µij , with explanatory variables. Following the literature of Mur-
tazashvili and Wooldridge (2016), Papke and Wooldridge (2008), I add the Mundlak-Chamberlain
device or the longitudinal average of time-varying explanatory variables, Xit, which models the
permanent unobserved heterogeneity as a linear projection of the time average of time-varying
characteristics. This approach accounts for the endogeneity of inputs with regards to unobserved
factors like an individual fixed-effect model. Since the panel dataset used here is unbalanced, it is
impossible to apply the original approach suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and include a complete
history of lagged explanatory variables, X+t = (Xi2, ..., XiT ) and Z
+
t = (Zi2, ..., ZiT ). But I can
apply the modified version of Wooldridge (2005) proposed by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013),
who suggest using the within-means of individual time-varying characteristics based on all periods













Z+i are an analog to the Mundlak-Chamberlain device but without initial values. This approach
accounts for the possible endogeneity of the CMA with regards to unobserved factors in a manner
similar to the fixed-effect model.
The second issue is related to the initial conditions and occurs due to the correlation between µij
and the initial observation Yij1, and the endogenous initial conditions require a specification of the
conditional distribution for Yij1.I address this problem using the solution suggested by Wooldridge
(2005) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013). This solution specifies the conditional distribution
of µij via an auxiliary model that includes an initial dependent variable, Yij1, the initial-period
explanatory variables, Xi1 and Zi1, and within-means of individual time-varying characteristics
based on all periods excluding the first period observations,X+i . The model specifies the following
conditional density of the unobserved heterogeneity:
µij = π1jYij1 +X
+
i π2j + π3jXi1 + Z
+
i π4j + π5jZi1 + ηij = Giπj + ηij (1.3)
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where X+i is the within-means of individual time-varying characteristics based on all periods ex-




t=2Xit; Yij1 is the initial-period dependent
variable; Xi1 is the initial-period explanatory variables; Z+i is the within-means of the CMA in-




t=2 Zit; Zi1 is the
initial-period CMA; ηij is the error term where Cov(ηij; υijt+1) = 0. The vector Gi consists of
the initial dependent variable, initial explanatory variables, and within-means of explanatory vari-
ables in subsequent periods. The approach suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal (2013) has several advantages. It does not require instruments, because the initial
conditions are not modeled separately (in contrast to Heckman (1987) approach). It can be applied
to unbalanced panels, and the within-means terms X+i and Z
+
i allow for the correlations between
the explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity, µij .
The substitution of equation (1.3) into (1.2) leads to the standard random-effects multinomial
logit model:
ln
Pr(Yit+1 = m, m ∈ {PE, SE1, SE2)})
Pr(Yit+1 = NE)
= Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j +Xitβ3j +Giπj + ηij (1.4)
To estimate the model with the unobserved heterogeneity, ηij , I use two approaches. In the
first approach, I assume multivariate normality of the error term, ηij ∼ N(0;σ2η). In the second
approach, I use a variation of the discrete factor approximation (Heckman and Singer 1984).
Endogenous Locations of Branches. Identification of the causal effect of the CMA on self-
employment is challenging because the choice of where to locate a bank is not exogenous. In
particular, the decision to open or close a branch is endogenous to the local economic conditions
that also affect an individual’s home location and the decision to become self-employed. There
are several solutions to this issue. One possible solution is to control for a large set of variables
that proxy the local economic conditions at the county level, for example, the number of business
establishments, the unemployment rate, the share of the population with professional, scientific,
management and administrative education. For this approach, I add the above set of variables that
define local economic conditions, Lit, to equation 1.4. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of a
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possible correlation of the unobserved individual permanent heterogeneity with the variables of
the local economic conditions and the initial condition problem, I include analogs to the Mundlak-




t=2 Lit, and the initial period local economic conditions, Li1.
ln
Pr(Yit+1 = m, m ∈ {PE, SE1, SE2)})
Pr(Yit+1 = NE)
= Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j +Xitβ3j + Litβ4j + Fiπj + ηij
(1.5)
where Fiπj = π1jYij1 +X+i π2j + π3jXi1 + Z
+
i π4j + π5jZi1 + L
+
i π6j + π7jLi1.
Equation (1.5) is the main specification for the empirical part of the paper. I estimate equation
(1.5) using both of the estimation approaches to the unobserved heterogeneity, ηij , that I described
above.
Then, I estimate equation (1.5) using the lagged measure of the CMA, Zit−1. The one-year
measure of the CMA, Zit−1 is assumed to be exogenous conditional on the time-constant unob-
served effect (µij) and time-varying observed factors that may influence the opening of new bank
offices in a given area.
Another approach is to estimate model equation (1.5) only for individuals who remained at the
same location so any change in the borrower-lender distance was attributable to changes in banks’
location.
Finally, I used an instrumental variable for changes in the local CMA. I apply the instru-
ment suggested by Nguyen (2019) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006), which is the exposure to
merger-induced consolidation at the Census tract-level13.I consider mergers of large banks, defined
as mergers where both banks held at least US$1 billion in pre-merger assets. The average Census
tract is 1.5 square miles, and the decision of large banks to merge is plausibly exogenous to the
local economic conditions in a Census tract where both banks have a branch. The merge-induced
13 In the literature, it is acceptable to use overidentified models to assess the validity of IV. In this paper, I use the
exact identified model, and it is impossible to validate instrumentation (Wooldridge (2016)), but for further research,
I would like to use more than one instrumental variable. However, some papers state that the validity of IV implied
by the economic model is an identifying assumption that cannot be tested (Parente and Silva (2012), Deaton (2010)),
because the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of IV implied
by the underlying economic model, and therefore provides little information on the possibility of identifying the
parameters of interest.
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consolidation decreases competition between banks at the tract level, which may be followed by
a branch closure (Nguyen 2019), an increase in the borrower-lender distance, a decrease in the
number of branch employees and a decline in the local CMA.
The empirical framework for the instrumental variable approach is the dynamic multinomial
logit model with the CMA measure, Zit, treated as endogenous: ln
Pr(Yit+1=m, m∈{PE,SE1,SE2)})
Pr(Yit+1=NE)
= Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j +Xitβ3j + Litβ4j + Fiπj + ηiβ5j
Zit = Eitγ1 + Yijtγ2 +Xitγ3 + Litγ4 +Git + ηi
(1.6)
where Eit equals 1 if individual i lives in a Census tract where two large banks merged in year t,
Fiπj = π1jYij1 +X
+
i π2j + π3jXi1 + Z
+
i π4j + π5jZi1 + L
+
i π6j + π7jLi1, Git = Yij1ψ1 +X
+
i ψ2 +
Xi1ψ3 + Zi1ψ4 + Li1ψ5 + L
+
i ψ6. For computational simplicity, I assume that ηi ∈ N(0; 1).
Equation (1.6) jointly estimates the labor decisions of individual i due to changes in the CMA,
Zit, and the CMA as a function of the individual characteristics, Xit, the current labor state, Yijt,
the local economic conditions, Lit, and the instrumental variable Eit. The error term, ηi, contains
the permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity that influences both the labor decisions and the
CMA for individual i.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Sources of Data
This paper combines several sources of U.S. data. The primary source is the Community
Advantage Panel Survey (CAPS) database collected by the UNC Center for Community Capital.
CAPS comprises 11 years of panel survey data provided by approximately 5,000 low- and moder-
ate income homeowners and renters during the period of 2003-2014. The homeowners recruited
to participate in CAPS received mortgages between 1999 and 2003 through the Community Ad-
vantage Program, and the participating renters were recruited to match these homeowners with
respect to the geographic proximity and income ceilings. The survey collects a wide variety of
information, including demographics and family formation, mobility and housing tenure choice,
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unemployment, wealth and asset holdings, social capital and civic engagement, and housing sat-
isfaction. The CAPS database was used in several works (e.g., Quercia, Freeman, and Ratcliffe
(2011), Manturuk, Lindblad, and Quercia (2017))14. The data Appendix provides more informa-
tion about the survey design.
Data on career choices and self-employment. CAPS contains self-reported information about
the primary work activity at the time of the survey. The survey has four types of employment:
workers in private businesses, government workers, self-employed workers, and workers in a fam-
ily business. The first two categories - workers in private businesses and government workers -
were combined as paid employed workers. Self-employed and workers in a family business are
different labor types due to various liabilities; therefore, I consider only self-employed in the anal-
ysis and exclude workers in a family business from the data sample.
Data on bank locations. All information about bank offices comes from the FDIC SOD data
for 2003-2014 as of June 30 of the corresponding year. The SOD data include full street addresses
of bank headquarters and bank branches, the total amount of assets, and the latitude and longitude
of the bank headquarters and each bank branch since 2008. The maps in Figure 1.5 show the
location of all banks and branches from the FDIC SOD database (red dots) in 2003 and 2014. The
FDIC SOD contains information about 87,279 bank locations in 2003 and 94,521 bank locations
in 2014. Thus, the number of bank offices increased, but the locations are more concentrated. To
show the difference in concentration between 2003 and 2014, Figure 1.5 also reflects the hot spot
analysis (blue areas). The hot spot analysis shows the z-score for the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for
each location in a dataset. Darker areas tell where bank locations with high values cluster spatially.
Bank addresses were transferred to geocodes15 and linked to home locations of CAPS respon-
dents in such a way that each respondent was linked to each bank within the same state. Bank
14 The full list of publications is available at: https://communitycapital.unc.edu/files/2017/10/
Paper_22929_extendedabstract_1348_0.pdf
15 Some banks addresses were dropped as incomplete. On average, branches with incomplete information account
for less than 1 percent of the total number of branches.
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locations are used to identify the distance16 from the location of a respondents home to banks (the
minimum distance; the distance to 5, 10, or 15 nearest banks); the number of banks per state, the
number of banks within 5, 10 or 15 miles from the respondent.
Other sources of data. Other sources of data include the U.S. Census Bureau Statistics
(County Business Patterns), the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment data (county-
level unemployment rates and civilian labor force size), the FDIC Assets and Liabilities report
(total number of employees per branch (full-time equivalent)), ACS county-level demographic in-
formation, and the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago17.
1.5.2 Explanatory Variables
As explanatory variables, I use a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, such as gender
(=1 if female), race (white, black, other), and Hispanic ethnicity. In addition, there are time-varying
variables, including the age, age squared, years of schooling, the spouse’s years of schooling, the
marital status, the household size, the number of children under the age of 14 currently living in the
household, the region, calendar year effects, the log of the value of large durable assets (houses,
land, other real estate and cars), the difference in log-income for wage and salary workers and
self-employed (non-incorporated) at the county level. The latter variable serves as a substitute
for individual income, which is likely to be endogenous. Unfortunately, CAPS does not contain
detailed information about wages or personal income, only aggregated household income.
As a measure of the local economic conditions, I use the total population at the zip-code level,
the share of the population with professional, scientific, management, and administrative education
at the zip-code level, the unemployment rate and the number of business establishments at the
county level.
16 For estimating the distance, I use the SAS geocode procedure, because SAS allows to estimate distances without
sending sensitive information to external servers, but the downside of using SAS is that it estimates the Euclidean
distance between 2 locations. Boscoe, Henry, and Zdeb (2012) conclude that for nonemergency travel the added





Types of self-employment. The biggest challenge is how to identify different types of self-
employment for the empirical analysis. Unfortunately, using the CAPS database, its impossible
to identify self-employed businesses without business loans (or with restricted access to the credit
market). In the empirical model, the main specification is based on types of self-employed busi-
nesses incorporated or unincorporated. Bopaiah (1998) shows that the incorporated self-employed
are more likely to get a business loan in comparison to the unincorporated self-employed, and
their businesses are more capital intensive. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) prove that incorporated
and unincorporated self-employed businesses demand different skills and abilities: the incorpo-
rated self-employed have comparatively strong nonroutine cognitive abilities, while the unincor-
porated self-employed are involved in businesses demanding relatively strong manual skills. Later,
Levine and Rubinstein (2018) differentiate between entrepreneurs and other self-employed and,
for empirical analysis, they use the incorporated self-employed as a proxy for the entrepreneurial
self-employed, and the unincorporated self-employed for other self-employed persons. For the
main specification, I adopt the approach proposed by Levine and Rubinstein (2018) and use the
incorporated self-employed as a proxy for the Type-1 self-employed, and the unincorporated self-
employed as a proxy for the Type-2 self-employed.
An alternative definition for different types of self-employment rests on the idea that en-
trepreneurial businesses are more capital intensive and more likely to depend on external funding.
A definition for types of self-employment can be also based on the degree to which a business de-
mands entrepreneurial abilities. Unfortunately, the database offers no assessment of respondents’
abilities. To evaluate the level of entrepreneurial skills, I use an external database O*NET On-
Line18. The database contains a list of occupations along with the level of entrepreneurship. The
level of entrepreneurship has a range between 1 and 5, where level 1 is equivalent to little or no
enterprising activities; level 5 is equal to an extensive level of entrepreneurship. Self-employed
workers are referred to Type-1 if the level of entrepreneurial activities is equal to 4 or 5; all other
18National Center for O*NET Development, www.onetonline.org/
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self-employed workers are Type-2.
Another alternative definition of types of self-employment is based on the aggregate level of the
following characteristics: problem-solving, creation of new ideas, and thinking. Using the charac-
teristics of occupations from the O*NET OnLine database, I aggregate them into a standardized
z-score index. A higher value of the index means a higher level of problem-solving, creation of
new ideas and thinking. Self-employed workers with z-scores above 0 are referred to the Type-1
self-employed, all others - to the Type-2 self-employed.
One more definition of types of self-employment originates from studies on labor informality
in developing countries. In these studies, it is common to refer to small-scale self-employment
as the informal labor sector. Studies from countries with a large informal sector find that new
bank openings create incentives for individuals working in the informal sector to switch to jobs
with verifiable income to be eligible for loans and, thus, transit to paid employment (Malkova,
Peter, and Svejnar 2018). The share of self-employed individuals with unverifiable income may
fall when the borrower-lender distance decreases. Thus, the effect of the CMA on the transition to
self-employment may differ across individuals. The literature has not explored labor informality
broadly in the U.S., because the biggest challenge is the availability of data, and most American
surveys do not contain questions about informal labor activity. The study by Bracha and Burke
(2016) finds that 37 percent of non-retired U.S. adults participated in some informal work in 2015.
Due to the lack of other data and methodology for the labor informality in the U.S., I use the non-
participation in the earned income tax credit (EITC) program, if an individual is eligible for this
program, as a proxy for potential tax evasion. The Type-1 self-employed are self-employed persons
who participated in the EITC, while the Type-2 self-employed are those who did not engage in the
EITC even if they were eligible for this program. Workers not eligible for the EITC are excluded
from the sample for estimation of the model for this definition.
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Table 1.1: Alternative Definitions of Types of Self-Employment
Type 1 Type 2
Based on survey questions
1. Type of business Incorporated Unincorporated
2. Proxy for tax evasion Participation in EITC Non-participation in EITC
by eligible individuals by eligible individuals
Based on ILO occupation codes (matched to National Center for O*NET dataset)
3. Level of entrepreneurial abilities High entrepreneurial abilities Low entrepreneurial abilities
4. Level of abilities: problem solving, Z-score index >0 Z-score index ≤ 0
creation of new ideas and thinking
Credit market accessibility. The CMA is measured as an index based on a combination of
the following variables: the average distance from an individual to 10 nearest banks, the number
of banks and branches within five miles from the individual’s home, the number of bank workers
per 1,000 population at the county level. These variables were aggregated into a standardized z-
score index. The z-score index is scaled in such a way that a higher value means better access
to the formal credit market (e.g., shorter borrower-lender distance). And, for the convenience of
interpretation, I standardize the CMA index with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Instrumental variable. To estimate equation (1.6), I create an instrumental variable, Eit, that
equals one if individual i lives in a Census tract where two large banks undergo a merger in year t,
and zero otherwise. To create the instrument, I use data on merger activity from the Mergers and
Acquisitions Database (M&A) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Each buyer or target bank
has an RSSD ID that allows for matching the M&A database to the FDIC SOD; thereby, I can
identify branches that can be exposed to merger-induced consolidation. I consider mergers of large
banks, where both banks held at least US$1 billion in pre-merger assets. For all branch addresses
in the FDIC SOD, I identify the Census tract number applying the SAS geocode procedure. Using




In this section, I discuss my empirical findings and the implications for how an increase in the
CMA affects self-employment19. First, I present the results from the estimation of the dynamic
multinomial logit model of employment with correlated random effects using both parametric and
non-parametric approaches. For the main specification as given in equation (1.5), self-employment
is defined on the basis of the legal structure; the Type-1 and Type-2 self-employed are owners of
incorporated and unincorporated businesses respectively. Second, I use the estimated coefficients
to determine the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the CMA on the size of four employment
sectors and the transition probabilities among the sectors. Partly as a robustness check, I then
present the results from other specifications of the model and finally determine how improvements
in banking services across geographical areas affect self-employment.
1.6.1 Access to Credit Products
In this subsection, I discuss how the borrower-lender distance influences the access to credit
products. Unfortunately, CAPS data do not contain information about business-related lending,
and in a perfect situation, the effect of the CMA on labor decisions should be estimated through
the access to credit products. Using the available data, I highlight two main groups of variables
characterizing the access to credit: the access to different credit products and indicators of a reduc-
tion in the credit access. The variables describing the access to various products are a set of dummy
variables: if the respondent applied for a new credit card in the last 12 months, if the respondent
applied for a car loan in the last 12 months, if the respondent opened a new charge card in the
last 12 months, if the respondent refinanced a mortgage in the last 12 months. The indicators of
a reduction in the credit access are a set of dummy variables: if the respondent’s application for
a new credit was rejected in the last 12 months, if the respondent’s available limit for credit cards
was reduced in the last 12 months, if the respondent was asked to pay off the remaining balance
for a loan in the last 12 months, if the respondent filed bankruptcy in the last 12 months.
19 In the Appendix, I verify that my CMA index is a valid measure of the credit availability in that individuals are
more likely to apply for loans and more likely to be approved as the CMA increases.
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To evaluate the effect of the CMA on the access to credit, I estimate a random-effects pro-
bit model for each of the variables characterizing the access to credit. To avoid the problem
of a possible correlation of the unobserved individual permanent heterogeneity with explana-










Pr(Cit = 1) = Φ(Zit−1β1 +Xitβ2 + Litβ3 +X
+
i β4 + L
+
i β5 + νi) (1.7)
where νi are i.i.d., νi ∈ N(0, σ2ν), and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Cit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent applied for a new credit card in the last 12
months; if the respondent applied for a car loan in the last 12 months; if the respondent opened
a new charge card in the last 12 months; if the respondent refinanced a mortgage in the last 12
months; if the respondent’s application for a new credit was rejected in the last 12 months; if the
respondent’s available limit for credit cards was reduced in the last 12 months; if the respondent
was asked to pay off the remaining balance for a loan in the last 12 months; if the respondent filed
bankruptcy in the last 12 months.
The results of equation (1.7) are shown in Table 1.4. They suggest that an improvement in the
CMA (shorter borrower-lender distance) increases the probability of receiving a new credit card,
having a car loan, obtaining a charge card or refinancing a mortgage. These results support the
evidence from the literature that a shorter borrower-lender distance makes loans more affordable.
Another part of the results suggests that improvements in the CMA decrease the risk of a reduction
in the access to credit. A shorter borrower-lender distance reduces the risk of the application for a
new credit being rejected, a reduction in the available limit for credit cards, being asked to pay off
the remaining balance, and filing bankruptcy.
1.6.2 Results of the Main Model
The results of the main model are reported in Table 1.5. The table presents the relative risk
ratios from the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with correlated random effects.
The dependent variable is the employment state at t + 1, with the non-employment state chosen
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as the base outcome and the paid employment state selected as the omitted lagged dependent
category. The table presents the results of the model for the main specification, and the type of self-
employment is defined based on the legal status of businesses the Type-1 self-employed are owners
of incorporated businesses, and the Type-2 self-employed are owners of unincorporated businesses.
Table 1.5 shows both of the estimation approaches for permanent unobserved heterogeneity. In this
subsection, I discuss the results for the parametric estimation, µij ∈ N(0, σ2ν); the results for the
discrete factor approximation are very similar.
The previous labor status plays an essential role in the type of the current job. Predictably, for
self-employed and non-employed individuals, the risk of working in the paid employment sector in
period t+1 relative to paid employed workers is small and negative (the odds are 0.191, 0.181, and
0.040, respectively). For both types of the self-employed, the previous job in the self-employed
sector increases the risk of being either type of the self-employed. The relative risk ratio of being
Type-1 self-employed in period t+1 relative to paid employed workers in period t is 50.034 for the
Type-1 self-employed and 13.791 for the Type-2 self-employed. The non-employed are less likely
to switch to any type of self-employment. The relative risk ratio of being Type-2 self-employed in
period t+1 relative to paid employed workers in period t for the Type-1 self-employed and 23.329
for the Type-2 self-employed.
The result of primary interest is the coefficient of the CMA index. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the CMA index increases the odds of being paid employed by 1.182. At the same time,
a one-standard-deviation improvement in the CMA increases the relative risk of becoming Type-1
self-employed by 1.323. But the relative risk ratio for the Type-2 self-employed is insignificant.
The value of large, durable assets plays an essential role in being self-employed and increases
the risk of being Type-1 self-employed or Type-2 self-employed, but it does not significantly in-
fluence the risk of being a paid employed worker. Furthermore, the difference in log-income for
wage and salary workers and self-employed workers increases the risk of being paid employed,
decreases the risk of being Type-2 self-employed, and does not influence the risk of being Type-1
self-employed.
To show the AMEs of a one-unit improvement in the CMA index on the size of sectors and the
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transition probabilities, I re-estimate the main model including the interaction terms between the
employment state, Yijt, and the credit market accessibility index, Zit:
ln
Pr(Yit+1 = m, m ∈ {PE, SE1, SE2)})
Pr(Yit+1 = NE)
= Yijtβ1j + Zitβ2j + Yijt ∗ Zitβ3j +Xitβ4j+
+ Litβ5j + Fiπj + ηij
(1.8)
where Fiπj = π1jYij1 +X+i π2j + π3jXi1 + Z
+
i π4j + π5jZi1 + L
+
i π6j + π7jLi1.
Table 1.6 presents the AME of a one-unit improvement in the CMA index on the size of sec-
tors. This one-unit improvement in the CMA index increases the population share of the Type-1
self-employed by 0.24 ppt and reduces that of the Type-2 self-employed by 0.22 ppt. Table 1.6
also shows the average marginal effect (AME) of Zit on the probability of switching between em-
ployment states. For the Type-1 self-employed, an increase in Zit by one standard deviation raises
the likelihood of turning from paid-employment to self-employment by 0.03 ppt. The effect of Zit
on the likelihood of staying in the Type-1 self-employment sector is substantial (2.41 ppt improve-
ment). Similarly, there is a substantial positive effect on the probability of moving from the Type-2
self-employed (1.45 ppt). For non-employed individuals, the effect is 0.31 ppt. For Type-2 occupa-
tions, the effect is the opposite. An improvement in the CMA (by one standard deviation) decreases
the chances of paid-employed workers to become Type-2 self-employed by 0.02 ppt. The effect
for the Type-1 self-employed is -1.19 ppt. The likelihood of staying in the self-employed sector for
Type-2 occupations goes down by 6.53 ppt per unit increase in Zit. The AMEs for non-employed
individuals are smaller in magnitude, but they are still substantial. The transition probability from
the non-employed status to the Type-2 self-employed goes down by 1.11 ppt. The probabilities of
transition to paid employment are important results. A one standard deviation improvement in the
CMA decreases the probability of switching from Type-1 self-employment to paid employment by
1.02 percentage points. But for Type-2 self-employment, an improvement in the CMA increases
the probability of switching to paid employment by 4.46 ppt, which supports the evidence from
the theoretical model (Corollary 1) that a reduction of non-interest costs of borrowing is likely to
increase the probability of switching from Type-2 self-employment to paid employment.
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In addition to the AMEs (which are calculated across all individuals in the sample), I also
estimate the marginal effects at the mean values of covariates and at different values of Zit. These
results are plotted in Figure 1.8. The figure shows the predicted probabilities of being Type-1 or
Type-2 self-employed at different values of the CMA index. The results show a rise in the size of
the Type-1 self-employed and a decline in the Type-2 self-employed as the CMA improves.
1.6.3 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I discuss the results of several robustness analyses. First, I compare the re-
sults of the main model (equation1.5) for different distributional assumptions for the unobserved
heterogeneity. I estimate the main model (equation 1.5) under assumptions about the multivariate
normality of the error term and the discrete factor approximation of the error term. As I mentioned
in the previous section, rthe results for both distributional assumptions produce similar effects (Ta-
ble 1.5). Second, I compare the results of the main model (equation 1.5) for different definitions of
self-employed types (Table 1.7). Third, I show the results for different identification assumptions
for possible endogeneity of the CMA, that I described in the Identification section (Table 1.8).
Last, I show the results of the main model (equation 1.5) for the definition of self-employed types
based on potential tax evasion (last three columns in Table 1.7) and draw comparisons with the
literature on developing countries.
Different definitions of self-employed types. The results of the main model (equation1.5) al-
ternative definitions of self-employed groups are presented in Table 1.7. Columns (1)-(3) show the
results of the main specification discussed above. Columns (4)-(6) present the results of the model
when the definition of types of the self-employed is based on the degree to which the business
demands entrepreneurial abilities. Columns (7)-(9) present the results of the model when the defi-
nition of types of the self-employed is based on aggregate characteristics of occupations. Columns
(10)-(12) present the results of the model when the definition of types of the self-employed is
based on participation in the EITC program (I discuss these results later). In all specifications, a
one-standard-deviation improvement in the CMA increases the relative risk of becoming Type-1
self-employed and paid employed.
Solutions to possible endogeneity of CMA. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show the results for different
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identification assumptions discussed in the ”Identification” section. The result of primary interest
is the coefficient of the CMA index. For the base specification under an assumption about the
exogenous CMA, a one-standard-deviation increase in the CMA index increases the odds of being
paid employed by 1.103. At the same time, a one-standard-deviation improvement in the CMA
increases the relative risk of becoming Type-1 self-employed by 1.197. But the relative risk ratio
for the Type-2 self-employed is insignificant. The results for other identification assumptions are
similar: including a lag for the CMA, estimating the model only for individuals who did not move
from their original place of living, and including the local economic condition (within-means of the
local economic condition and the initial conditions). It is interesting that the results for the latter
specification, including the Mundlak-Chamberlain device for the CMA and the initial value of the
CMA, show even higher relative risk ratios. A one-standard-deviation increase in the CMA index
increases the odds of being paid employed by 1.207, and a one-standard-deviation improvement in
the CMA increases the relative risk of becoming Type-1 self-employed by 1.376.
The results for equation (1.6), which jointly estimates the labor decisions of individual i due
to changes in the CMA, and the CMA as a function of the local economic conditions and the
instrumental variable, are shown in Table 1.9. The instrumental variable equals one if individual
i lives in a Census tract where two large banks undergo a merger in year t. The results show that
the exposure to merger-induced consolidation negatively influences the CMA. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the CMA index increases the odds of being paid employed by 1.097. At
the same time, a one-standard-deviation improvement in the CMA increases the relative risk of
becoming Type-1 self-employed by 1.188. But, the relative risk ratio for the Type-2 self-employed
is insignificant.
Tax evasion and labor informality. The last three columns of Table 1.7 provide the results
for estimation of the main model (equation 1.5) with the definition of types of the self-employed
based on participation in the EITC program. I use non-participation in the EITC program if the
individual is eligible for this program as a proxy for potential tax evasion20. The results show
20 Participants in the EITC program face a higher chance of a tax audit.
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that a one-standard-deviation improvement in the CMA increases the relative risk of becoming
Type-1 self-employed and paid employed but decreases the risk of being Type-2 self-employed.
These results support the evidence from studies about labor informality in developing countries
(Malkova et al., 2019). Unfortunately, the literature has not explored labor informality broadly
in the U.S. Bracha and Burke (2016) find that 37 percent of non-retired U.S. adults participated
in some type of informal work in 2015. The biggest challenge is the data availability because
primary American surveys dont contain questions about informal labor activity. Bracha, Burke,
and Khachiyan (2015)21 mention that the Survey of Informal Work Participation within the Survey
of Consumer Expectations (SCE-SIWP) is the only one that covers a nationally representative
sample.
1.7 Conclusion
The paper investigates the role of the credit market channel in the decrease of self-employment
in the U.S. To analyze the impact of the CMA on entry into self-employment, I develop a three-
sector Roy model that differentiates between two types of the self-employed: entrepreneurs who
have growth-oriented businesses that demand physical capital and business loans (Type-1) and
other self-employed (Type-2). The focus of the study is the physical accessibility of banks, and
I use a novel data source (the Community Advantage Panel Survey database) that allows me to
measure the proximity of credit market institutions for all respondents in the dataset. A combi-
nation of the following variables creates the index of physical availability of banks: the average
distance from the respondent’s home to 10 nearest banks, the number of banks within 5 miles from
the location of the respondent’s home, and the average number of workers per bank’s office at the
county level.
The empirical study estimates how the selection into self-employment can be driven by credit
market institutions using the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with correlated
random effects. The analysis shows a heterogeneous response to changes in the CMA among
21 The authors find that informal work does embody a significant amount of labor market slack. In particular,
they find that the formal labor market conditions are negatively correlated with informal work hours, and those who
are employed part-time for economic reasons are especially likely to turn to informal work, as might be expected if
informal hours represent a substitute for formal work.
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two types of the self-employed. Type-1 self-employed workers are owners of growth-oriented
businesses that demand physical capital and business loans, and an improvement in the CMA
increased transition to self-employment. A one-unit improvement in the CMA index increases the
population share of the Type-1 self-employed by 0.22 ppt.
The Type-2 self-employed are owners of less capital-intensive businesses, and an improvement
in the CMA decreased the transition to this self-employment type. A one-unit improvement in
the CMA index decreases the population share of the Type-2 self-employed by 0.20 ppt. These
results can be interpreted oppositely: the recent decline in the physical CMA shrinks the size of
the Type-1 self-employed sector and increases the size of the Type-2 self-employed sector, and
the cumulative marginal effect is negative, which indicates that the overall self-employment is
decreasing. Type-2 self-employed workers switch to paid employment to be able to use credit
products when banks increase their presence near the agent’s place of living. This result supports
the evidence from studies of countries with a large informal sector which show that new bank
openings create incentives for individuals working in the informal sector to switch to jobs with
verifiable income to be eligible for loans and, thus, transfer to wage employment (Malkova et al.,
2019). Labor informality has not been broadly explored in the U.S., and this evidence can be
widely discovered in further research.
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1.8 Figures
Self-Employment in the U.S.
Figure 1.1: Number of the Unincorporated Self-Employed in the U.S.
Notes. This figure shows the number of the self-employed from the Current Population Survey (thousands,
seasonally adjusted).
Figure 1.2: Self-Employment Rate in the U.S.
Notes. The left figure shows the self-employment rate as a proportion of the total employment from OECD
(2019), Self-employment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/fb58715e-en (seasonally adjusted). The right figure
shows the self-employment rate as a proportion of the total employment made up of unincorporated and
incorporated self-employed workers from the Current Population Survey (thousands, seasonally adjusted).
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The Credit Market Accessibility in the U.S.
Figure 1.3: Average Minimum Borrower-Lender Distance
Notes. The figure shows the average minimum distance between a borrower and a lender estimated from
the CAPS and the FDIC SOD (miles).
Figure 1.4: Credit Market Accessibility Index
Notes. The figure shows the CMA index. The CMA is measured as an index based on a combination of
the following variables: the average distance from an individual to 10 nearest banks, the average number of
the banks and branches within 5 miles from the individuals home, the number of bank workers per 1,000
population at the county level.
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Figure 1.5: Location of All Banks in the U.S.
a) 2003 b) 2014
Notes. The figures show the location of all banks and branches form the FDIC SOD database (red dots). In
2003, there were 87,279 bank locations in the FDIC SOD; in 2014, there were 94,521 bank locations.
Figure 1.6: Location of All Banks in the U.S. and the Hot Spot Analysis
a) 2003 b) 2014
Notes. The figures show the location of all banks and branches form the FDIC SOD database (red dots)
and the hot spot analysis made in the ArcGis (blue areas). In 2003, there were 87,279 bank locations in
the FDIC SOD; in 2014, there were 94,521 bank locations. The hot spot analysis shows the z-score for the
Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for each location in a dataset. Red areas tell where bank locations with high values
cluster spatially. Red areas are hot spots with 99 percent confidence, white areas are not significant. Blue
areas are cold spots with 99 percent confidence.





























where xj is the attribute value of feature j, wi,j is the spatial weight between features i and j, n
is equal to the total numbers of features. To be a statistically significant hot spot, a feature should
have a high value and be surrounded by other features with high values as well.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Paid -E Type-1 SE Type-2 SE NE
Age** 39.51 40.02 41.11 42.68
(10.28) (9.66) (9.82) (11.61)
Female*** 0.53 0.37 0.48 0.66
Married*** 0.58 0.74 0.63 0.45
Number of kids*** 1.03 1.34 1.05 1.08
(1.18) (1.34) (1.25) (1.25)
Number of HH members* 1.88 1.97 1.91 1.91
(0.78) (0.67) (0.81) (0.95)
Race: White*** 0.64 0.76 0.68 0.50
Black 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.33
Other*** 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.17
Ethnicity: Hispanic* 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17
Years of schooling 14.73 15.01 14.71 14.27
(3.52) (3.56) (3.52) (4.08)
Distance to the nearest bank**, miles 1.22 1.47 1.29 1.1
(1.56) (1.78) (1.62) (1.39)
Aver. distance to 10 nearest banks***, miles 2.84 3.29 2.89 2.48
(2.85) (2.79) (2.62) (2.49)
Number of banks within 5 miles*** 36.13 40.43 32.21 31.72
(40.04) (59.30) ( 42.27) (42.24)
Number of bank workers per 1000 pop. 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.26
(0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.22)
Total assets***, 2014 $ 15 801.6 43 507.91 25 598.05 9 019.31
(45 536.39) (118 841.8) (73 625.28) (35 357.12)
CMA*** (z-score) 0.03 0.018 0.017 -0.17
(0.97) (1.01) (1.06) (1.01)
Notes. This table shows the summary statistics. Stars (*) shows the p-value for the t-test of mean
differences between Type-1 and Type-2 self-employment, where *** denotes significance at 1%
level, ** means significance at 5% level, * means significance at 10% level. The number of banks
per 1,000 population is calculated at the state level. The table indicates that the distance is in miles.
The total assets are the sum of non-housing and housing assets adjusted for inflation.
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Table 1.3: Transition Matrix between Labor Markets. Definition Based on Type of Business:
Incorporated/Unincorporated
Paid-employed Type-1 self-employed Type-2 self-employed Non-employed Total
at t+1 at t+1 at t+1 at t+1 at t+1
Paid-employed at t 94.38% 0.72% 1.08% 3.82% 84.7%
19467 148 223 788 20626
Type-1 self-employed at t 21.68% 56.26% 17.76% 4.3% 2.20%
116 301 95 23 535
Type-2 self-employed at t 23.09% 16.59% 55.12% 5.19% 2.85%
160 115 382 36 693
Non-employed at t 26.7% 1.08% 1.32% 70.9% 10.26%
667 27 33 1771 2498
Total at t 83.81% 2.43% 3.01% 10.75% 100%
20410 591 733 2618 24352
Notes. This table shows the average annual probabilities of transitioning from status j at time t to
status k at time t+ 1. The definition of types of self-employment is based on the type of business.
The Type-1 self-employed are owners of incorporated businesses, the Type-2 self-employed are
owners of unincorporated businesses.
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Table 1.4: Random-Effects Probit Model of Access to Credit
Credit Products
Credit Card, t Car Loan, t = 2003 Charge Card, t Refinance Mortgage, t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CMA, t− 1 1.081*** 1.047*** 1.047* 1.050**
(0.032) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018)
Observations 17,279 3,003 19,097 5,547
Reduction in Access to Credit
Application for new credit Reduction in the Available Being Asked to Pay Off Filing
has been denied, t Limit for Credit Cards, t Remaining Balance, t Bankruptcy, t
(5) (6) (7) (8)
CMA, t− 1 0.991* 0.952* 0.862** 0.913*
(0.036) (0.025) (0.059) (0.048)
Observations 14,283 6,080 5,200 13,283
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The table presents the relative risk ratios from the random-effect probit model of access
to credit market equation (1.7), where the random-effect term is νi ∈ N(0, σ2ν). TThe dependent
variables are dummy variables that equal 1 if the respondent applied for a new credit card, applied
for a car loan, opened a new charge card, refinanced a mortgage, had an application for a new credit
rejected, had the available limit for credit cards reduced, was asked to pay off the remaining loan
balance, or filed bankruptcy in the last 12 months. Columns present the full estimates of equation
(1.7) with correlated random effects, using the Mundlak-Chamberlain devise to avoid a problem of
possible correlation of the unobserved individual permanent heterogeneity with explanatory vari-
ables. Other explanatory variables include the value of large durable assets, the durable logarithm
of differences in average wages of salary workers and unincorporated self-employed workers, in-
dividual characteristics such as age, gender, etc., the local economic conditions, year dummies,
four regional dummies, fixed effects for the first year of the stochastic process, and the Mundlack
device.
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Table 1.5: Dynamic Multinomial Logit Model of Employment Choices.
The types of self-employment are based on the legal status of the business (main specification)
ηij ∈ N(0; 1) The discrete factor approximation of ηij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1 PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1
T-1 SE, t 0.191*** 50.034*** 12.107*** 0.185*** 74.910*** 17.372***
(0.074) (28.507) (7.376) (0.066) (27.314) (6.502)
T-2 SE, t 0.181*** 13.791*** 23.329*** 0.185*** 21.695*** 48.681***
(0.059) (6.212) (11.985) (0.051) (6.813) (13.917)
NE, t 0.040*** 0.390** 0.223*** 0.031*** 0.276*** 0.172***
(0.007) (0.148) (0.087) (0.003) (0.080) (0.047)
CMA 1.182** 1.323* 0.974 1.116** 1.213** 0.981
(0.090) (0.221) (0.172) (0.053) (0.111) (0.088)
Assets 1.095* 1.070** 0.987 1.235 1.528*** 1.187**
(0.062) (0.119) (0.121) (0.849) (0.110) (0.083)
log (wPE)- log (wSE2) 1.435*** 1.751 0.756** 1.316*** 1.662 0.928**
(0.335) (0.690) (0.305) (0.044) (0.592) (0.014)
Control variables, Xi and Xit
Age 1.250*** 1.311*** 1.310*** 1.281*** 1.342*** 1.346***
(0.039) (0.116) (0.085) (0.045) (0.109) (0.097)
Age sq. 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.997*** 0.996*** 0.996***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.930 0.547*** 0.719* 0.912 0.536*** 0.705**
(0.089) (0.100) (0.125) (0.092) (0.099) (0.122)
Race:
Black 0.749*** 0.698 0.575*** 0.751*** 0.698* 0.572***
(0.074) (0.154) (0.121) (0.077) (0.152) (0.116)
Other 0.670** 0.380*** 0.832 0.651** 0.369*** 0.810
(0.107) (0.122) (0.256) (0.112) (0.127) (0.238)
Hispanic 0.851 1.290 0.569* 0.852 1.283 0.565*
(0.146) (0.444) (0.171) (0.147) (0.408) (0.181)
Married 1.013 0.952 1.283 1.015 0.951 1.286
(0.131) (0.282) (0.328) (0.135) (0.269) (0.334)
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ηij ∈ N(0; 1) The discrete factor approximation of ηij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1 PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1
Control variables, Xi and Xit
Education:
Some college 1.163* 1.427* 1.423* 1.174* 1.441* 1.434*
(0.104) (0.303) (0.257) (0.112) (0.307) (0.276)
Bachelor’s degree 0.795 1.550 0.662 0.814 1.599 0.688
(0.189) (0.769) (0.384) (0.197) (0.743) (0.341)
Grad degree 1.363** 2.344*** 1.806** 1.427** 2.455*** 1.878**
(0.186) (0.640) (0.456) (0.217) (0.671) (0.483)
Number of kids:
1 child 1.060 0.812 0.937 1.061 0.815 0.938
(0.120) (0.203) (0.204) (0.134) (0.207) (0.215)
Fewer than 4 kids 0.756** 0.835 0.676* 0.748** 0.827 0.668*
(0.091) (0.197) (0.145) (0.094) (0.190) (0.149)
More than 4 kids 0.566 0.874 0.849 0.583 0.900 0.870
(0.252) (0.571) (0.438) (0.246) (0.563) (0.514)
Number of HH members:
2 adults in HH 1.283** 1.539 0.861 1.314** 1.581 0.883
(0.146) (0.490) (0.210) (0.165) (0.461) (0.229)
Fewer than 4 adults in HH 1.359** 1.662 1.015 1.398** 1.721 1.049
(0.205) (0.641) (0.292) (0.218) (0.599) (0.323)
More than 4 adults in HH 1.515 1.959 1.850 1.510 1.951 1.840
(0.555) (1.604) (1.459) (0.618) (1.757) (1.310)
Local Economic Conditions, Lit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




i Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial conditions, Yi1, Xi1 and Li1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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ηij ∈ N(0; 1) The discrete factor approximation of ηij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1 PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1
Unobserved effect
Var(ηij) 0.121 0.110 0.413 0.072 0.042 0.034
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026)
Cov (ηi,PE; ηi,SE1) 0.211 0.031
(0.013) (0.023)
Cov (ηi,SE1 ; ηi,SE2) 0.277 0.037
(0.013) (0.023)
Cov (ηi,PE; ηi,SE2) 0.141 0.037
(0.016) (0.022)
Observations 11,922 11,922
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The table presents the relative risk ratios from the dynamic multinomial logit model of
employment with correlated random effects. The dependent variable is the employment status at
time t+1, with the non-employed chosen as the base outcome. Columns 1 and 2 present the full es-
timates of equation 1.4 with correlated random effects, using the WRS solution to the endogeneity
of the initial conditions. The following variables are included but not shown: year dummies, four
regions, fixed effects for the first year of the stochastic process, the Mundlack device and the inter-
cept, regional economic characteristics. The omitted category of race is white, that of the number
of kids is no kids, and that of the number of adults is 1 adult.
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Table 1.6: Post-estimation predictions: Average marginal effect of CMA on transition probability
Type-1 SE, t+ 1 Type-2 SE, t+ 1 PE, t+ 1 NE, t+ 1
Sector size in t+ 1 0.24 pp -0.22 pp 0.59 pp -0.61 pp
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0025)
Transition probabilities
PEt → 0.03 pp -0.02 pp 0.09 pp -0.11 pp
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0027)
Type-1 SEt → 2.41 pp -1.19 pp -1.02 pp -0.02 pp
(0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0029)
Type-2 SEt → 1.45 pp -6.53 pp 4.46 pp -0.63 pp
(0.0260) (0.0292) (0.0271) (0.0012)
NEt → 0.31 pp -1.11 pp 4.41 pp -3.39 pp
(0.0082) (0.0063) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Notes. This table shows the AME of an increase in the CMA by one standard deviation on the
probability of transition to self-employment. Types of self-employment are defined based on the
type of business. The Type-1 self-employed are owners of incorporated businesses, the Type-1
self-employed are owners of unincorporated businesses.
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Figure 1.7: Marginal Effects of CMA on Predicted Probability of Being Self-Employed
Notes. The figure shows the predicted probabilities of being in one of the two types of self-employment
at different values of the CMA index. The index is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. Predictions are obtained at sample means of covariates and based on the WRS model
reported in Table 1.5.
Figure 1.8: Marginal Effects of CMA on Predicted Probability of Being Self-Employed
Notes. The figure shows the predicted probabilities of being in one of the two types of self-employment
at different values of the CMA index. The index is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. Predictions are obtained at sample means of covariates and based on the WRS model































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9: Results of Dynamic Multinomial Logit Model of Employment Choices with Endoge-
nous CMA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PE, t+ 1 T-1 SE, t+ 1 T-2 SE, t+ 1 CMA
T-1 SE, t 0.179*** 55.906*** 16.721***
(0.076) (24.659) (7.263)
T-2 SE, t 0.162*** 17.028*** 34.201***
(0.057) (6.094) (10.662)
NE, t 0.031*** 0.238*** 0.146***
(0.004) (0.079) (0.045)





Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The table presents the relative risk ratios from the joint estimation of labor decisions of
individual i (the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with correlated random effects)
and the CMA (equation 1.6). The dependent variable is the employment status at time t + 1 and
the CMA at time t. The non-employment status is chosen as the base outcome in the dynamic
multinomial logit model. Variable ”IV” equals to 1 if the individual i lives in a Census tract where
two large banks undergo a merger in year t. The following variables are included but not shown:
the value of large durable assets, the durable logarithm of differences in average wages of salary
workers and unincorporated self-employed workers, individual characteristics, the local economic
conditions, year dummies, four regions, fixed effects for the first year of the stochastic process,




LABOR INFORMALITY AND CREDIT MARKET DEVELOPMENT
This chapter is a joint work with Klara Sabirianova Peter (UNC Chapel Hill) and Jan Svejnar
(Columbia University, CERGE-EI, CEPR and IZA).
2.1 Introduction
Labor informality is a widespread phenomenon for developing and emerging economies (Packard
et al. 2012), and the informal sector plays an important role in labor market adjustment. Traditional
studies examine this phenomenon through existence of imperfect economic institutions that prevent
work formally (Straub (2005), Djankov et al. (2003) and etc.). In contrast, this paper contributes
to the literature on labor informality by investigating a novel mechanism that may implicitly re-
duce informal employment. The study explorers the link between the credit market development
and the labor mobility among three labor market states: informal sector, formal sector, and non-
employment. There are large literatures related, respectively, to informality, credit markets and
labor mobility. However, our paper is motivated by the fact that the literatures have not explored
the effects of the credit market development on the labor mobility between the informal and formal
sectors. In many developing and emerging economies, due to the absence of a credit score system,
a formal lender may set a credit limit based on the verified amount of its borrower’s income. For
example, banks may ask individual loan applicants to submit an official salary account statement
filled out by their employer. Due to unverifiable informal income, the interest cost of borrowing
for an informal worker can be higher than for a formal one, and the credit limit may be lower. To
get a loan, an informal worker must first formalize his or her income (switch to a formal job), and
then apply for a loan. Thus, more accessible credit markets create incentives for transition from
the informal labor market to the formal one.
The article discusses the labor informality and the accessibility of the credit market in the
context of Russia. In 2016, the labor informality accounted for nearly 20.5 percent of the labor
force in Russia1. The study utilizes several sources of Russian data between 2006 and 2016. The
main database is the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), and we use individual-,
household-, and community-level data from the RLMS database. We also use regional credit mar-
ket data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The CMA is measured as an index based
on a combination of the following variables: the presence of banks or bank offices in a community;
the spatial distance from the community with no banking services to the nearest bank; the spatial
distance from the community with only one bank office to the nearest other bank; the number of
credit organizations and branches per capita in the region. A higher value of the CMA implies a
closer proximity to banking services and more banks in the community, which presumably would
reduce loan-related costs. Another database used for this study is Regional statistics from the Fed-
eral State Statistics Service that contains a large set of variables which proxy the local economic
conditions (the real regional GDP per capita; the regional unemployment rate; the 5-year moving
average of the regional inflation rate).
The paper proceeds in two parts. In the theoretical framework, we use a simple two-period
model (based on Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)) that captures the essential features of the rela-
tionship between the credit market development and the informality and provides testable predic-
tions for the empirical work. Based on the model, agents’ decisions are shaped by the interaction
between non-interest costs of borrowing (such as application fees and the value of time spent on
preparing application documents and travelling to the bank), the amount of the borrowers income
and the credit limit set by the formal lender based on the verified amount of income. The key
testable implication of this model is that the credit market development associated with a reduction
of borrowing costs (interest and non-interest) increases the share of verifiable income and, hence,
the share of formal employment.
The second part of the paper presents an empirical model that aims to estimate the impact of the
1 Reported by the Federal State Statistic Service (FSSS) in its statistical yearbook Labor Force, Employment and
Unemployment in Russia, 2016. The FSSS uses the definition of the labor informality according to the Resolution
Concerning Employment Statistics in the Informal Sector adopted by the 15th International Conference of Labor
Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993.
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CMA on the labor mobility between the informal and formal sectors, and to do it we test several
hypotheses. First, we estimate a simpler static model for the probability of taking a loan, and we
find that the probability of obtaining a loan is higher for formal workers than for either informal
workers or non-employed individuals. Second, we compare the predicted transition probabilities
between borrowers and non-borrowers after controlling for demographics and other explanatory
variables and show that the probability that informal workers would switch to formal jobs is higher
for borrowers than for non-borrowers. Third, we use a dynamic multinomial logit model of em-
ployment with correlated random effects to investigate how the labor mobility between three labor
market states (an informal job, a formal job, and non-employment) is associated with changes in
the CMA. In the paper, we also discuss solutions to the main problems associated with this class
of dynamic models with correlated random effects: the endogeneity issue and the initial condi-
tions problem. To make sure that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables,
we follow the literature by adding the Mundlak-Chamberlain device or the longitudinal average
of time-varying explanatory variables. The initial conditions problem stems from the correlation
between the error term and the initial observation for employment status. Endogenous initial con-
ditions require a specification of the conditional distribution for the initial employment status. In
the literature, there are two common approaches to specifying this distribution: Heckman (1981),
and Wooldridge (2005) and Rabe-Hesketh and Scrondal (2013). The paper estimates and compares
both solutions to the initial conditions problem. The results of the model show that a relaxation of
credit constraints increases the probability of transition from informal to formal jobs. Estimations
show that an improvement of the CMA by one standard deviation increases the chances of informal
sector workers switching to formal jobs by 5.4 ppt. These results are robust in different specifica-
tions of the model. Policy simulations show that the development of credit market institutions has
a higher effect on reducing the informality in communities with stronger credit constrains.
2.2 Literature Review
One strand of the literature examines the informal sector. For instance, Djankov, Lieberman,
Mukherjee, and Nenova (2003) explore the benefits and costs of informality, noting that informal
activities are costly to entrepreneurs who operate them because they cannot utilize government
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and some private sector services available to firms that fully comply with regulations. However,
many transition economies have experienced a surge in informal business activities because the
quality of public services is poor and there are few tangible benefits of going formal. The authors
note that the benefits of informality lie in avoidance of taxes, fees for licenses, permits and other
regulatory charges, while the costs of informality are an implicit tax in the form of bribery, lack
of safety nets such as insurance and pension, and inability to tap into formal credit markets. The
latter observation is a key motivation for our study.
Gokalp, Lee, and Peng (2017), in turn, note that the degree of competition from the informal
economy may affect the decision of formal firms not to fully comply with government regulations.
Informal firms may have inherent advantages of cost savings by not complying with regulations.
Using data from the World Banks Productivity and Investment Climate Survey, the authors find that
when the cost of compliance is high, firms would lower their compliance levels to stay competitive
with the informal sector. On the other hand, when institutions provide sufficient advantages to
firms staying in the formal sector, such as easier access to credit, firms are more likely to comply
with regulations and stay in the formal sector. The study is relevant for our analysis in that it
suggests that credit provision may have an effect on the formality v. informality decision of firms.
Another large literature focuses on the part played by formal vs. informal credit. One possible
way to investigate the existence of informal loan market is through formal credit market imper-
fections such as moral hazard, adverse selection and contract enforcement problems. The adverse
selection theory of credit markets was started by the paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). This paper
provides a model when the lender cannot distinguish between borrowers and their inherent risks.
The model considers loan contract with limited liability and involuntary default risk of borrowers.
Also, Stiglitz (1990) shows that informal lenders are better informed about borrowers than formal
banks, which reduces enforcement or monitoring cost, which makes the loan cheaper for borrower.
The role of risk taking for borrowers is discussed in the paper of Lee and Persson (2016). Their
model assumes two-sided altruism when the borrower’s utility directly enters the lender’s utility
and in reverse. While some of the implications regarding reduced agency costs and lower inter-
est rates in informal credit arrangements are similar, the implied cost of using informal credit is
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different. Specifically, in the model the informal credit directly increases the borrowers’ aversion
to failure, thereby undermining entrepreneurs willingness to take risk and potentially limiting in-
vestment and firm size. Other papers by Ghosh and Ray (2016); Giné (2011) study a problem of
loan enforcement in the informal credit market. Their findings are consistent with the idea that the
limited enforcement is the key friction in the credit market.
Nguimkeu (2014) is an example of studies that investigate the provision of credit to informal
sector entrepreneurs. Using data from a cross-sectional sample of Cameroon households in the
National Survey on Employment and Informal Sector (EESI), the author finds microfinance pro-
grams that provide credit access to the poor reduce the size of subsistence economy by up to 10
percent while doubling the share of entrepreneurs in the informal sectors. Microfinance can also
improve the total earnings capacity of the informal sector by up to 30 percent and has the potential
of lowering heterogeneity by reducing the misallocation of skills and capital. In another study,
using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey, Akudugu (2014) finds that farm households
in Ghana that were given formal credit increased their welfare expenditures, including spending
on healthcare, education, housing, sanitation and energy, whereas those that were given informal
credit reduced their welfare expenditures. Levine, Lotti, Batini, and Kim (2010), in turn, conduct
a literature review on the informal economy and find mixed evidence on whether informal labor
and credit markets are good or bad. Informality has been found to be negatively correlated with
economic growth by lowering productivity and restricting firms and individuals access to public
services. However, within a credit-rationing framework, informal credit markets could be associ-
ated with positive growth rates by reducing the cost of credit rationing and separating the high risk
firms from the low risk ones. In such settings, informal credit markets can improve the efficiency
and have a positive impact on the formal economy. Relevant to our study, Kislat, Menkhoff, and
Neuberger (2017) note that in many developing countries the advantage of informal lenders over
formal lenders is in their lower collateral requirements that result from their information advantage
obtained by ongoing economic and social relationships. Using household survey data from rural
Thailand, they find that formal lenders rely on collateral about 40 percent more often than informal
lenders, and the difference is explained by informal lenders better information on borrowers. A
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shorter distance between informal lenders and borrowers improves information about the latter.
Karaivanov, Kessler, et al. (2013) study borrowers choice between formal and informal credit in a
setting with strategic default due to limited enforcement. Provided that social capital is sufficiently
large, they show that the optimal informal loan features zero interest rate and requires no physi-
cal collateral. In contrast, formal loans charge positive interest and are collateral-based, making
them a priori less attractive to borrowers. Default on formal loans is thus less costly than default
on informal loans. Therefore, borrowers choose formal credit for riskier (or larger) loans while
informal credit is used for small investments and projects with zero or low default risk. Several
papers discuss traditions and stable habits connected with informal borrowing in developing coun-
tries, when the appearance of formal credit institutions doesnt have influence on the demand for
informal loans (Mingmaneenakin and Tubpun (1993), Bell (1990)).
There is also a literature that is relevant for our study in that it deals with labor informality
in Russia. Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013) show that informal employment is a wide-spread phe-
nomenon in the Russian labor market using panel data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS) between 2003-2011.The incidence of informal employment varies widely across
regions in Russia, from low single digits in the high growth and diversified regions of Moscow
and St. Petersburg, to 23 percent in 2010 in the relatively poor Southern Region and roughly 38
percent in the North-Caucasus region. Younger workers, males, workers with primary education
or less, persons with low skills, workers in construction and trade and related services have a sub-
stantially higher likelihood of being informally employed. The firm size does not capture informal
employment well in an emerging economy like Russias. Individuals who are more risk loving
tend to have a higher probability of selecting themselves into informal employment. Slonimczyk
and Gimpelson (2015) investigate the degree of persistence of informality and the extent to which
informal jobs are steppingstones to a formal job by developing a dynamic multinomial logit model
and using RLMS data to estimate the coefficients. Informal jobs account for about 20-25 percent of
employment in Russia and the persistence rates in the informal sector are almost 50 percent. The
probability of transitioning to a formal job is higher if the original state is the informal sector com-
pared to non-employment. Endogenous selection of individuals into the informal sector explains
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a large share of the state dependence, measured as the average difference between the probability
of staying in the same labor market state and the probability of entering from other origin states,
and the low transition rate into formal jobs. Once we account for observed characteristics, the state
dependence of informal employees is 7.6 percent for males and 9.6 percent for females
2.3 Theoretical model
In this section, we present a simple two-period model that (a) captures the essential features
of the relationship between the credit market development and the informality, and (b) provides
testable predictions for our empirical work.
2.3.1 Setup
The link between the informality and the credit market accessibility can be illustrated in the
standard framework that builds on Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). We abstract to a stylized
two-period model for the clarity of predictions, although the extension to the infinite horizon is
straightforward. Assume that a household lives for two periods - the present (t) and the future
(t+1). The household faces an intertemporal budget constraint:
Period 1: ct = yt + bt (2.1)
Period 2: ct+1 = yt+1 − (bt + κ)(1 + r) (2.2)
The first-period budget constraint implies that the household enters period t with no assets and
no debt, earns income yt, consumes ct, and can borrow bt to cover the deficit (or save as −bt).
In the second period, the borrowing household pays back the loan principal bt, interest r, and the
fixed non-interest cost of borrowing κ. The saving household earns interest and does not incur
cost, κ = 0. The fixed cost of borrowing may include not only the direct fees charged at closing
such as origination and application fees but also indirect cost to borrowers such as the value of
time spent preparing application documents and travelling to the bank. We assume that these loan
application expenses are rolled into the future period payment with interest.
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Suppose that the household’s income in the second period grows at a rate of gt+1:
yt+1 = (1 + gt+1)yt (2.3)
At time t, the household forms an expectation of future income:
Etyt+1 = (1 + g)yt (2.4)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information available in period t, and
g = Etgt+1 is the expected rate of future income growth.
In an economy without borrowing constraints, we can solve the standard problem of a house-
hold that maximizes the expected utility of consumption over two periods:
Etyt+1 = (1 + g)yt (2.5)
In the economy without borrowing constraints, we can solve the standard problem of a house-
hold that maximizes the expected utility of consumption over two periods:
U = u (ct) + βEtu (ct+1) (2.6)
The utility function is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave, differentiable, and time sep-
arable, with β as an intertemporal discount factor. The first order condition for an internal solution
of the consumer’s problem leads to a well-known Euler equation:
u′ (ct) = β (1 + r)Et [u
′ (ct+1)] (2.7)
If the utility function is quadratic as in Hall (1978), u (ct) = −12 (č− ct)
2 , where č is the
bliss level of consumption, and assuming β (1 + r) = 1, then the first order condition simplifies to
ct = Etct+1 . Using equations (2.2) and (2.4), one can solve for the desired amount of borrowing:
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b∗t =
gyt − κ (1 + r)
(2 + r)
(2.8)
The positive anticipated income growth minus future expenses, gyt − κ (1 + r) > 0, yield
positive desired borrowing. The borrowing household prefers to take a larger loan (1) when the
expected income growth goes up, (b∗t )
′




> 0 , (3) when the interest rate falls, (b∗t )
′





Suppose that a household applies for a loan to one of the formal lenders and does not consider
informal sources. The formal lender may set a credit limit based on the verified amount of income.
It is common for lenders to verify the employment of potential individual borrowers and request
documents validating the source of income. For example, Russian banks frequently ask individual
loan applicants to submit the official salary account statements filled out by the employer. We
assume a simple linear relation between the maximum amount of loan, b̃t, and officially declared
income: b̃t = πθyt , where θ is the share of income that can be verified by the lender and π
is an association parameter. The lender does not know θ and yt for each applicant but observes
households declared income θyt . The key assumption is ∂b̃t∂θ > 0 , or the positive association
between the credit limits and the verifiable portion of income. To apply for a loan, the household
must have some minimal amount of verifiable income, θ > 0 . If the total household income comes
from official sources, then θ = 1.
With the above borrowing constraint, one can write:
b∗t ≤ b̃ (2.9)
gyt − κ (1 + r)
(2 + r)
≤ πθyt (2.10)
For the household facing the borrowing constraint, θ becomes an important consideration. To
approach the desired amount of borrowing, individuals have incentives to increase θ by taking a
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job in the formal sector where income can be verified or by formalizing the labor contract with




= − (1 + r)





The key testable implication of this model is that the credit market development associated
with a reduction in the borrowing costs r and κ increases the share of verifiable income and hence
the share of formal employment. The prediction (3a) also implies that θ′′κr < 0 and θ
′′
κyt > 0 . In
other words, the effect of improved credit accessibility (by lowering κ ) on θ is predicted to be
larger when borrowers are more credit-constrained, i.e., face a higher interest rate and earn lower
income.
2.4 The Dynamics of Informality and Local Credit Market
2.4.1 Timeline of the Model
Our theoretical model shows that formal sector workers benefit from the credit market devel-
opment, and that access to credit may create additional incentives for informal sector workers to
switch to a formal sector job. In Figure 2.1, we depict a hypothetical timeline of the job choice
decision linked to the loan decision. Since most of interviews in our survey take place at the end
of the year, we take the time of observation t to be the end of a given year. The timeline captures
an individual who at time t does not plan to obtain a loan in the next 12 months ( Pt = 0 ). The
“no loan intention” condition ensures that the person’s employment status at time t is independent
of his future loan decisions.
At time t, an individual i is observed to be in one of three possible employment states j,
Yijt : F=formal job, I=informal job, and O=no job. The individual enters the next period with
a set of constant background characteristics X̃i (e.g., gender, ethnicity, and parents education) and
time-varying individual characteristics Xit (e.g., schooling, marital status, household income, and
household structure).
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At time t or at some point of time after it, the individual observes characteristics of the local
credit market such as the proximity to bank services, Ci,t+u1 , 0 ≤ u1 < 1, and decides to act on
this information. For example, a newly opened bank office nearby may motivate the individual
to apply for a loan ( Pi,t+u2 = 1 ). The potential loan applicant knows (or learns) that formal
lenders require a proof of official income.2 An individual who does not satisfy the loan requirement
(e.g., by working unofficially) may decide to switch to a formal job, Yi,j=I,t Yi,j=F,t+u3 , if such an
opportunity presents itself. We define the switch of jobs broadly, encompassing any change in the
formal-informal status. It may, for instance include cases when an informal employee remains
at the same place of work but formalizes the relationship with the current employer by signing a
labor contract or by asking the employer to pay wages officially. With a documented source of
labor income, the likelihood of obtaining a loan increases, and Li,t+u4 = 1 if the loan application
is successful.
At the end of the following year at time t+1, an econometrician observes the (new) employment
status , Yij,t+1 , updated individual characteristics , Xi,t+1 , the latest credit market conditions,
Ci,t+1 , the respondent’s intention to obtain a loan in the following 12 months, Pi,t+1 , and whether
or not the individual has taken a loan in the past year Li,(t,t+1) . The obvious limitation of the annual
household survey is that no more than one transition in employment status per year per person may
be observed. The possible chain of multiple transitions within an one-year time interval (e.g.,
F → I → O) is recorded in the data as a single transition (e.g., F → O). We denote any transition
as Yijt Yij,t+1 and model it via the dynamic multinomial logit process described below.
2.4.2 Dynamic Multinomial Logit Model of Employment
Let us for the moment ignore credit-related variables and focus on the transition of individual i
from the employment status at time t to the employment status at time t+1. This transition may be
modelled within a dynamic multinomial logit equation:
2 In Russia, different lenders have different requirements. A standard loan application package includes the bor-
rower’s application, an original income statement for the last 3 or 6 months certified by the employer, and a copy of the
labor book with complete records of the person’s official employment history. Additional documents per bank request
may include an employment contract as well as documents confirming other regular income such as social security
benefits, property income, etc. Once the documents are submitted by the borrower, the loan approval can take from a
few hours to a few weeks depending on the type and amount of the loan.
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Y ∗ij,t+1 = Yijtγj + X̃iβ1j +Xitβ2j + µij + εij,t+1 (2.13)
where Y ∗ij,t+1 is the latent propensity of individual i to be in employment status j at time t+1.
The term µij is the random effect that captures time-invariant individual-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity, and it is assumed to be correlated across employment states. εij,t+1 is an i.i.d. error term
that follows a Type 1 extreme value distribution. The process is observed at times, t = 1, . . . , T .
Individual characteristics, Xit, are assumed to be strictly exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with εij,t+1
. To mitigate potential endogeneity concerns, the values of explanatory variables are taken at time
t, before the transition occurs, rather than at t+1. The main parameter of interest is γj which shows
both the state dependence and the mobility of individuals across employment states between t and
t+1.
Two main issues arise in the estimation of this class of dynamic models with correlated ran-
dom effects. The first one is the assumption that µij is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
To allow for such correlation, we follow the literature by adding the Mundlak-Chamberlain de-
vice or the longitudinal average of time-varying explanatory variables, Xit (Murtazashvili and
Wooldridge, 2016; Papke and Wooldridge, 2008).
The second issue is the initial conditions problem that stems from the correlation between
µij and the initial observation Yij1. Endogenous initial conditions require a specification of the
conditional distribution for Yij1. In the literature, there are two common approaches to specifying
this distribution. Heckman (1981) proposes to estimate equation (2.13) jointly with the process for
the initial value of the dependent variable, as in equation (2.14).
Y ∗ij1 = X̃iθ1j +Xi1θ2j +Ri1θ3j + ςij + υij1 (2.14)
where ςij is assumed to be normally distributed (with mean zero and variance of σ2ς ) and cor-
related with µij , but not with εij,t+1. The model identification requires exclusion restrictions Ri1
or instruments for the initial employment status. These variables explain the employment status in
the first observation year but not in subsequent years, i.e., they must be uncorrelated with εij,t+1.
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An alternative solution to the initial conditions problem is offered by Wooldridge (2005). It
specifies the conditional distribution of µij via an auxiliary model that includes the initial depen-
dent variable, Yij1, and a complete history of lagged explanatory variables, X+i = (Xi2, . . . , XiT ).
As our panel is unbalanced, we cannot implement this approach in its original form. Instead, we
use the modified version of Wooldridge (2005) proposed by Rabe-Hesketh and Scrondal (2013)
(WRS). The WRS model specifies the following conditional density of the unobserved hetero-
geneity µij:
µij = Yij1π1j +Xi1π2j +X
+











, and Cov (ηij, εij,t+1) = 0 . The vector
Gi consists of the initial dependent variable, initial explanatory variables, and within-means of
explanatory variables in subsequent periods. X
+
i is an analog to the Mundlak-Chamberlain device
but without initial values. In the WRS estimator, initial conditions are not modelled separately, and
thus instruments are not necessary.
Substitution of equation (2.15) into (2.13) leads to the standard random-effects multinomial
logit model with a lagged dependent variable. We can re-write this model in a more conventional
log-odds form by choosing the informal sector as the base category:
ln
Pr (Yij,t+1 = m,m ∈ {F,O})
Pr (Yij,t+1 = I)
= Yijtγj + X̃iβ1j +Xitβ2j +Giπj + ηij (2.16)
The WRS approach has several advantages. First, the within-means term X
+
i allows for the
correlations between explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity, µij . Second, com-
pared to the Heckman approach, the WRS solution is less computationally intensive and does not
require exclusion restrictions. Third, compared to the original Wooldridge approach, the WRS
solution can be applied to unbalanced panels. For these reasons, we choose equation (2.16) as the
base model for our analysis, although the Heckman solution to the initial conditions problem is
also employed in the robustness analysis.
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2.4.3 Credit Market and Employment Transitions
In our empirical analysis, we test several hypotheses regarding the job informality and the
credit market development.
Hypothesis 1. The probability that informal workers would switch to a formal job is expected
to be higher for borrowers than for non-borrowers. One way to check for the differences in the
transition probabilities between borrowers and non-borrowers is via the Markov matrix of uncon-
ditional transition probabilities. We also compare the predicted transition probabilities between
borrowers and non-borrowers after controlling for demographics and other explanatory variables.
In addition, we employ the event study analysis to answer the following questions. Does the proba-
bility of transition to a formal job spike in the year of obtaining a loan? How does the job switching
probability for borrowers change before and after the year of taking a loan?
Hypothesis 2. A relaxation of credit constraints is likely to increase the informal formal transi-
tion probability. We test this hypothesis within the dynamic framework described above by adding
a two-way interaction term between the lagged employment status, Yijt, and the local credit ac-
cessibility, Cit. We can think of Cit as a reverse proxy for the borrowing cost κ in the theoretical
model. A higher value of Cit implies a closer proximity to banking services and more banks in the
community, which presumably would reduce loan-related expenses.
Y ∗ij,t+1 = Yijtγ1j + Citγ2j + (Yijt · Cit) γ3j + X̃iβ1j +Xitβ2j +Giπj + ηij + εij,t+1 (2.17)
To make the interpretation of results easier, we choose the base category to be “informal jobs”
in the dependent variable but “formal jobs” in the lagged dependent variable. This means that
positive values of γ3,j=I or γ3,j=N in the first outcome equation for Yi,j=F,t+1 imply an increase in
the likelihood of switching to the formal sector compared to staying in the informal sector when
credit accessibility improves. Thus, a positive value of γ3,j=I in the equation for formal jobs would
support Hypothesis 2. The one-year lagged measure of bank availability is assumed to be exoge-
nous conditional on the time-constant unobserved effect and time-varying observed factors that
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may influence the opening of new bank offices in the community. These observed factors include
the lagged employment composition, the demographic structure, and the market size measured by
the total population and household consumption. Since banks fulfill many functions (e.g., utility
payments, direct deposits of pensions and salaries, and transactions with legal entities), we assume
that the availability of banking services in a given year is not influenced by the future unobserved
shocks to an individual’s job choice, i.e., Cit is uncorrelated with εij,t+1 once the proper covariates
are included.
Hypothesis 3. The development of credit market institutions has a higher effect on reducing the
informality in credit constrained communities. . This hypothesis builds on the theoretical model
that predicts a higher responsiveness of the formal sector income to a decrease in loan application
costs for borrowers who are more credit-constrained. We test this hypothesis by comparing the
AME of Cit on the size of the informal sector across different types of communities based on the
equation (8) estimates. The communities are characterized in terms of their level of economic
development and the availability of banking services. We hypothesize that the development of
credit market institutions is likely to provide a greater return in the areas where previously the
income growth was lower and where credit institutions were less developed.
Hypothesis 4. The probability of obtaining a loan is expected to be higher for formal work-
ers than for either informal workers or non-employed individuals, ceteris paribus. This is a key
assumption of our theoretical model. Even though this assumption may be self-evident from the
institutional knowledge of the lending process in Russia and elsewhere, we prefer to verify it in
our data. In testing this hypothesis, we use a simpler static model for the probability of taking a
loan between time t and t+1.
L∗i,(t,t+1) = Yijtϕj1 + Citϕ2 + X̃iϕ3 +Xitϕ4 + λi + υi,(t,t+1) (2.18)









The static model without the lagged dependent variable fits better the Russian context where
the sharing of individual credit histories across financial institutions is not very common. The
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main parameter of interest, ϕj1 , is expected to be negative for categories of “informal jobs” and
“non-employment” , with “formal jobs” being the omitted category. Since some individuals may
have changed their job before time t in planning for future loans, we estimate equation (9) only for
individuals who, at time t, have no intention to apply for a loan in the next 12 months.
2.5 Data
We draw on individual-, household-, and community-level data in the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey Higher School of Economics (RLMSHSE).3 The survey sample is a probabil-
ity sample of the Russian population, and it is based on a stratified multi-stage sampling procedure.
While the panel started in 1994, we use annual data for 2006-2016 when credit market questions
were included in the survey. The survey is well suited for our analysis, as it contains longitudi-
nal information about the informality status, job transitions, and credit market participation. The
survey also collects community characteristics on infrastructure and markets, including the credit
market, for 160 RLMS communities. These communities are located across 32 regions (which
are equivalent to states in the U.S.) and all seven federal districts of the Russian Federation.4 We
restrict our analysis to prime-age individuals who are between 20 and 59 years old. In what fol-
lows, we give a detailed description of the employment variable and a brief introduction to the
other variables that we use in our empirical analysis, with more details on the latter variables being
provided in Appendix 1. We describe the credit-related variables in Section 5.
2.5.1 Employment Status, Yijt
The employment status has three broad categories: formal workers, informal workers, and the
non-employed. Formal workers are defined as individuals who are working at “an enterprise or
organization where more than one person works” and who are officially registered at their pri-
mary job. Official registration is determined based on the survey question “Are you on a work
3 The survey is done by the National Research University Higher School of Economics together with the Carolina
Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology at the Russian
Academy of Sciences.
4 The regions and districts are defined according to the official administrative division as of January 1, 2010. At
that time, the Russian Federation was comprised of 83 regions, including the two federal cities of Moscow and St.
Petersburg.
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roster, written work agreement, or work contract?” Informal workers are comprised of (a) un-
registered employees, (b) individuals who are not working at an enterprise with more than one
person (they could be self-employed or hired by a private person)5 and (c) individuals who are
engaged in individual economic activity (IEA).6 Combining these types of informal workers into
one group is justifiable because their income is not easily verifiable, and their employment record
is often undocumented for the loan purposes. In some specifications, we analyze the differences
in both borrowing and job switching outcomes across the subgroups of informal workers. The
non-employed group consists of individuals who do not have a primary job and are not engaged in
any IEA activity in a given reference week. We do not split the non-employed into the traditional
groups of unemployed and out of labor force because such distinction is of less importance for our
purposes and having fewer groups also reduces the computation time.7
The RLMS dataset for these three employment categories goes back to 1998 and has a complete
uninterrupted series over the estimation period (2006-2016). Table 2.1 shows the composition of
the employment status for every other year. There were no major structural changes over time.
The share of formal sector workers fluctuated between 61 and 65 percent. The share of informal
workers averaged at 17 percent of the total population in the age group of 20-59, or 21 percent of
the employed population. The upward trend in the informal share after 2008 was largely due to the
rising proportion of unregistered employees and workers hired by a private person. The share of
the non-employed was about 21 percent over the sample period.
Starting in 2008, the RLMS added a very interesting question: “What percent of earnings was
received officially, that is, taxes were paid?” While there could be some doubts in the truthfulness
of answers, we use this variable as an alternative definition of formal and informal workers. After
5 The distinction between the self-employed and those working for a private person can be made in the 2006-2014
surveys, but not later.
6 IEA workers include individuals who answered that they are currently not working but eventually admitted to
being engaged in (and paid for) an individual economic activity, such as sewing, taxi driving, babysitting, selling
products on the streets, etc.
7 The unemployment rate in Russia is relatively low. It was about 5 to 7 percent in 2006-2016. If we restrict the
third employment category to unemployed job seekers, the conclusions of the paper do not change.
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dropping respondents who did not answer this question such as the IEA workers and those who
worked last month but were not paid, we split the rest of the sample into three groups of earners
those with (1) only official pay, (2) partly unofficial pay, and (3) entirely unofficial pay. Of those
who answered this question, 82 percent reported receiving their earnings entirely through the of-
ficial channel, 11 percent admitted to getting some portion of earnings unofficially, and 7 percent
acknowledged that they received all their income unofficially; see Table 2.1 for the time-series in
these categories.
2.5.2 Explanatory Variables in the Main Specification, X̃i and Xit
We use three different types of explanatory variables. First, there are time-invariant individual
characteristics, X̃i , such as gender (=1 if female), Russian ethnicity, parents education, urban
residence, community population size, and the federal district where the respondent lives.
Second, there are time-varying variables, Xit , including years of schooling, marital status,
household size, number of children under the age of 14 currently living in the household, and
the log of real household expenditures on non-durables. The latter variable serves as a substitute
for household income, which is likely to be underreported in the informal sector because of tax
evasion (see Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). To mitigate the potential endogeneity of time-varying
variables, we take them at time t instead of t+1 and introduce two transformations in the form of
initial conditions, Xi1 , and time-averaged variables, X
+
i , known in the literature as the Mundlak-
Chamberlain device.
Third, there are exogenous time-varying variables which belong to Xit , but they are not being
transformed. These are age, age squared, calendar year effects, and the length of time between
interviews. As the transition probabilities may be sensitive to the interval between interviews, we
control for the length of this interval in all dynamic estimations.8
8 The median length between the annual interviews is 365 days, and 92 percent of all interviews are conducted
within 11 to 13 months apart from each other. However, there are some extreme cases when the interval between
interviews reaches as low as 7 months and as high as 17 months.
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2.5.3 Exclusion Restrictions for Initial Conditions, Ri1
Heckmans (1981) solution to the initial condition problem requires exclusion restrictions (in-
struments) for the first-period employment status. As an instrument, we utilize as an instrument
regional earnings at age 17 when most people in Russia finish high school. Age 17 is the most
likely time of making the college/work decision in which the sectoral choice of future employment
(formal vs. informal) is an important consideration. For many people, it is also the time of entry
to the labor market. The data on regional earnings at age 17 goes back to year 1965 when the
standard consumer price indices were not as reliable as now. To eliminate the effect of inflation,
we divide regional earnings by the country mean in each year and take the log of the ratio.
We also include a binary indicator for whether any state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were closed
in the community during the 12 months preceding the first-period survey interview. We treat this
variable as an exogenous shock that may influence the employment rate in the RLMS community in
the first period. Finally, we control for the regional size of the government sector and the informal
sector at the start of the stochastic process. Both variables are measured as a percent share of
regional employment.
2.5.4 Estimation Sample and Summary Statistics
We have sequentially applied the following sample selection rules to the individuals surveyed
in 2006-2016: (1) age 20-59, (2) non-missing employment status at time t, (3) non-missing em-
ployment status at time t+1, (4) non-missing control variables, and (5) the minimum of two ob-
servations per person. The last selection rule is needed to distinguish between Xi1 and X
+
i . The
number of observations excluded at each step is described in Table 2.2. After applying all the above
criteria, the main estimation sample has 76,452 observations for 15,147 adults. About 53 percent
of individuals in the estimation sample begin their sequence in year 2006. There was a large entry
wave in 2010 when the sample was replenished (15 percent). In other years, the entry into the
estimation sample is largely attributed to reaching age 20, marriage, and rejoining the panel. Due
to the varying start of sequences, we control for the year of entry in every estimated equation. The
panel drop-out rate is about 12 percent per year. We check the robustness of results by modelling
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a sample exit process in one of the specifications.
The summary statistics by employment status are presented in Table 2.3. Compared to formal
sector workers, informal sector workers tend to be younger, male, ethnically non-Russian, less
educated, raised by less educated parents, unmarried, living in larger households with more chil-
dren, and located in rural and less-populated settlements. These characteristics are expected and
consistent with previous studies on informality in Russia (e.g., Slonimczyk and Gimpelson, 2015,
Lehmann and Zaiceva, 2015). It is worth noting that the difference in household spending on non-
durable goods and services between formal and informal sector workers is less than 4 percent.9
From the second panel of Table 2.3, we observe that 17-year old individuals residing in regions
with below-than-average pay are more likely to work informally or to not work at all at the start
of the observed employment sequence. At time t =1, informal sector workers tend to come from
regions with a smaller share of government jobs and a larger share of informal employment. Yet,
the mean differences across employment groups are not evident in terms of the incidence of living
in communities with recently closed SOEs.
2.5.5 Credit Market Participation and Local Credit Accessibility
This section discusses credit-related variables and constructs an index of the local CMA.
Taking a Loan, Li(t,t+1)
We measure an individuals participation in the credit market by using the survey question “Did
any of household members take a loan in the last 12 months?” This question is asked annually
starting in 2006. The formulation of the question in Russian implies borrowing in the formal
credit market (i.e., from financial institutions) as opposed to another question in survey, which is
translated as borrowing from private individuals. Almost 78 percent of all household loans reported
in the RLMS over the 2006-2016 period are consumer loans for purchases of goods and services10,
15 percent are car loans, only 6 percent are mortgages, and 1.6 percent are student loans.
9 Formal workers tend to report higher income. The formal-informal unconditional gap is about 10 percent for
individual average monthly labor earning and 14 percent for household disposable income.
10 The RLMS survey does not have information on the size of loans. According to the Russian National Bureau of
Credit Histories, the average consumer loan in April 2016 was $ 2,300, which is about 4 months of annual earnings.
https://www.nbki.ru/company/news/?id=20354& sphrase id=95618
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Household borrowing from financial institutions is strongly procyclical and as can be seen in
Figure 2.2, Russia is no exception. The share of household borrowers was 27-31 percent when the
economy was growing in 2006-2008. It plunged to 17 percent during the 2009 Global Recession
and then it recovered to the level of 28 percent by 2012. During the most recent recession (2015-
2016) associated with a rise in oil prices and sanctions imposed on Russia, the share of loan-taking
households fell again to a very low level of 15 percent.
From the survey question it is unclear which household member took a loan. When estimating
equation (2.18), we select one adult member in each household to be the prime applicant for a loan
using three alternative approaches. First, a random adult member is assumed to make a borrowing
decision. Second, we choose the oldest male in the age group 20-59, and if the household does not
have males in this age group, then we choose the oldest female. Finally, we also estimate the loan
equation for the highest paid household member. This approach is the weakest of the three, as it
imposes the endogenous sample selection based on the employment status. In this specification,
informal workers and non-working individuals have a smaller likelihood of being selected into the
sample because of their lower income and larger income underreporting.
Intention to Obtain a Loan, Pit
Every year, respondents are asked about their plans to obtain a loan in the next 12 months.
On average, 6.2 percent of formal sector workers, 4.2 percent of informal sector workers, and
1.3 percent of non-employed individuals intend to obtain a loan in the next 12 months. The low
intention numbers do not match the actual rates of loan incidence shown in Figure 2.4. In other
words, the planning horizon for loans appears to be very short. This fact helps in the identification,
as it implies that most individuals do not plan for loans far in advance and they are hence unlikely
to select their job type a year earlier in the anticipation of a loan application in the following year.
Measure of Credit Market Accessibility, Cit
This section introduces available measures of credit market accessibility that serve as exoge-
nous shifters (or IVs) in the credit market participation equation. Two instrumental variables come
from the annual survey of RLMS communities, namely, the presence of banks or bank offices in
the community (a binary indicator) as well as the spatial distance from the community with no
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banking services to the nearest bank. In the Russian context, the largest country bank Sberbank is
often emphasized separately11. For instance, in RLMS, the distance to the nearest bank other than
Sberbank is also reported for the communities where Sberbank is the only bank service provider.
If the community has a bank or bank office which does not belong to Sberbank, the distance is as-
sumed to be zero. Ideally, given the structure of the community questionnaire, the distance should
be interacted with a dummy for having a Sberbank office in the community. The current version
of the paper does not do it yet.
Out of 160 RLMS communities in the 2016 survey, about 40 percent did not have any bank
office, 25 percent had only a Sberbank office, and the remaining 35 percent had offices of other
banks. The time series depicted in Figure 2.3 shows that the average distance from the communities
without bank services to any bank including Sberbank remains at the same level within the 20-
26 km range. At the same time, the average distance from Sberbank-only communities to the
nearest other bank has been trending downward from about 50 km in 2005 to 21 km in 2016. This
decreasing trend is likely to reflect the increased competition in the banking sector, and it may
provide a useful source of within-community variation in household credit borrowing over time. A
simple scatterplot in Figure 2.3 seems to indicate a negative relation between the average distance
to the nearest bank and the average share of loan borrowers, thus, supporting the idea of using the
distance as a potential IV.
There is, however, one big issue with using community-level measures of bank accessibility.
Almost 80 percent of RLMS respondents reside in the communities with two or more banks, which
tend to be medium or large cities. Thus, the non-zero measure of distance is only available for
the 20 percent of surveyed individuals who reside in constrained communities with either no bank
services (10 percent) or the bank services provided by only Sberbank (another 10 percent). Because
of the lack of variation in the community-level instruments in larger cities, we supplement the
community IVs with regional statistics on the number of Sberbank offices in 30 RLMS regions
11Sberbank (translated as Savings Bank) is a state-owned bank whose history goes back to 1841. It is the largest
bank in Russia and Eastern Europe and third largest in Europe. As of 2015, it accounts for 29 percent of aggregate
banking assets of Russia, includes about 100 subsidiary banks and branches, and operates over 16.5 thousand offices
(http://www.sberbank.com/about).
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and two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, over the 12 year-period12.
Fig. 2.4 shows the time-series for the total number of Sberbank offices, with a clear break in
series after 2010 when Sberbank began reformatting its branch network by closing offices with
unsatisfactory conditions and opening new banking centers in cities and mobile units in remote
areas. The reformatting policy has reduced the total number of offices from about 20,000 offices
in 2010 to 16,500 offices in 2016. Yet, the Sberbank annual report claims that the accessibility of
banking services has improved due to mobile units and remote services13. In our data, we do find
the increased association between the number of Sberbank offices per 1,000 population and the
regional share of household credit borrowers after 2010; see Figure ??. This result is good news
for the loan equation as it improves the strength of IV, but it may raise valid concerns regarding
the potential reverse effects of the household demand for loans on the number of offices. Because
Sberbank fulfills many functions (e.g., utility payments, direct deposits of pensions and salaries,
and transactions with legal entities), we can argue that office opening/closing is not associated with
the immediate change in the household demand for loans. To further mitigate the potential reverse
effect, we use the one-year lagged number of Sberbank offices and control for regional economic
conditions.
Finally, we aggregate different measures of the credit market accessibility into a summary in-
dex. First, we calculate a simple average of standardized z-scores of the following four variables:
an ordered indicator for the bank presence in the community, two distance measures, and the num-
ber of bank offices per 1,000 population. Each z-score is rescaled in such a way that a higher value
means a better access to the formal credit market (e.g., shorter spatial distance to bank services or
more bank offices). Then, for the convenience of interpretation, we standardize the credit market
accessibility index with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. An alternative approach
12The regional data come from the Federal State Statistics Service (www.gks.ru). The information on Sberbank
offices in each city is not publicly available. The regional statistics on offices operated by other banks is also not
published, except for the number of upper divisions such as subsidiary credit organizations and branches.
13Sberbank Annual Report 2016; http://www.sberbank.com/responsibility/reports
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to aggregating multiple variables into a summary index is to implement principal component anal-
ysis (PCA).14 As it turns out, the two indices based on the z-scores and the PCA are practically
identical, with a simple correlation of 0.98. For no specific reason, we choose the former index in
estimations.
The summary statistics provided at the bottom of Table 2.3 illustrate that, compared to officially
registered employees, individuals who are employed informally tend to live in credit-constrained
communities with significantly smaller bank presence.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Probability of Transition to the Formal Sector
A simple way to check for a possible association between job switching and credit market
participation between t and t+1 is to compare the transition matrices of employment status for
borrowers and non-borrowers, as reported in Table 2.4. We find that compared to non-borrowers,
borrowers have (i) a higher likelihood of switching from the informal sector to the formal sector
(0.287 vs 0.216); (ii) a considerably higher probability of finding a formal job at time t+1 if they
did not have a job at t (0.199 vs 0.131); and (iii) a lower probability of losing a job if they were
employed a year ago (0.036 vs 0.054 for formal workers and 0.121 vs 0.161 for informal workers).
If we split informal workers into subgroups, we find that in the year when they obtain a loan,
the probability of switching to the formal sector is highest for unregistered employees (0.361),
followed by those hired by a private person (0.279), and IEA workers (0.288). Self-employed
workers in loan-taking households tend to stay in their sector and have the lowest probability of
becoming registered employees (0.186). All categories of informal workers are more likely to
move to formal jobs when they participate in the credit market than if they do not participate. In
other words, the first descriptive evidence seems to be indicative of a potential link between the
credit market participation and leaving informality for formal jobs.
Another way to provide descriptive support of the main hypothesis is to use the event-study
14 The first component accounts for 70 percent of the total variance, with the following factor loadings: an indicator
for bank presence (0.586), distance to the nearest Sberbank office (-0.556), distance to the nearest office of other banks
(-0.562), and the number of bank offices per population (0.178).
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approach. Figure 2.5 shows the predicted probability of transition from the informal to the formal
sector using the event-study approach. The probability model is linear and controls for each year
before and after the event (the categorical timeline), a quartic polynomial of the current age, and
calendar year fixed effects. The event time is defined as the year when the household obtains the
first loan observed in the data. The plotted dots are the coefficients on the timeline variable plus the
average predicted share evaluated at timeline=0 (which is the omitted category). Panel A depicts
the predicted rate of entry of informal workers to the formal sector as a share of formal workers in
period t. In the year of obtaining the loan, there is a global spike that shows the increased share
of formal sector workers. Other local spikes do not have an empirical explanation. Panel B shows
the predicted switching probability for informal sector workers at period t-1 to move to the formal
sector in period t. There exists a global maximum in the predicted probability in year t when the
person takes a loan. There is also an increase in the switching probability between t-2 and t-1.
This could mean that agents are preparing to apply for a loan in advance. However, the previous
discussion of the intention to apply for a loan reveals that the planning horizon is relatively short.
2.6.2 Results of the Main Model
The results of the main model are reported in Table 2.5. The table presents the relative risk
ratios from the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with unobserved heterogeneity.
The dependent variable is the employment status at time t+1, with the informal status chosen as the
base outcome and the formal sector job chosen as the omitted lagged dependent category. Column
1 reports the mean and standard deviation of variables in the estimation sample. Columns 2 and
3 present the full estimates of equation (2.17) with correlated random effects and using the WRS
solution to the endogeneity of the initial conditions.
The previous labor status plays an important role in the type of the current job. Predictably,
the probability of finding a job in the formal sector relative to that of finding a job in the informal
sector is small for both informal sector workers and non-employed individuals (the odds are 0.155
and 0.169, respectively.15) The results of the main interest are the two-way interactions between
15 These effects that can be interpreted for the communities with mean zero credit market accessibility index.
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the CMA index and the labor market status in the previous period. For a formal sector worker, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the CMA index raises the odds of staying in the formal sector
relative to switching to the informal sector16 by 1.253 times (or 25 percent). At the same time,
for a formal sector worker, a one-standard-deviation improvement in Cit increases the relative risk
of becoming non-employed relative to finding an informal sector job17 by 1.154 times. It could
be because the informal sector shrinks. Theoretically, it is also possible that more people are
becoming non-employed. For example, if the improved credit accessibility provides incentives
for firms to formalize, then larger labor costs from higher taxes and more regulation may lead to
layoffs. To see which effect dominates, we calculate the average marginal effect (AME) of Cit on
the probability of switching between employment states. These results are reported at the bottom
of Table 2.5. We see that an increase in Cit by one standard deviation reduces the probability of
losing a formal sector job in the next period by a slight margin (-0.2 percentage points or ppt).
Thus, we do not find an adverse effect of the credit market development on employment. But the
effect of Cit on the likelihood of staying in the formal sector is substantial (1.7 ppt improvement).
Similarly, there is a large negative effect on the probability of moving to the informal sector (-
1.5 ppt). The relative risk ratios above one for the interaction terms in the first outcome equation
(1.215 and 1.228 for informal sector workers and non-employed individuals, respectively) imply
that the effect of local credit accessibility on corresponding odds is even stronger for these groups
than for formal sector workers. And if we look at the AME results, we can see that improved
credit market accessibility (by one standard deviation) increases the chances of informal sector
workers to formalize by 5.4 ppt. Their likelihood of staying in the informal sector goes down by
3.9 ppt and the probability of losing a job drops by 1.4 ppt per unit increase in Cit . The average
marginal effects of in Cit for non-employed individuals are smaller in magnitude, but they are still
substantial. The probability of transition from the non-employed status to the formal one goes up
16 The odds of staying in the formal sector relative to switching to the informal sector is estimated with the following
formula: Pr(Yi,t+1=F |Yi,t=F )Pr(Yi,t+1=I|Yi,t=F )
17 The relative risk of becoming non-employed relative to finding an informal sector job is estimated with the
following formula: Pr(Yi,t+1=N |Yi,t=F )Pr(Yi,t+1=I|Yi,t=F )
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by 3.9 ppt and that of transition from the non-employed status to the informal one declines by 3.6
ppt.
We also calculate the AME of Cit on the size of the sectors. A one-unit improvement in the
CMA index increases the population share of the formal sector by 2.3 ppt and reduces the informal
sector by 2.1 ppt. The effect of Cit on non-employment is negative but small in magnitude (-0.2
ppt). In addition to the AMEs (which are calculated across all individuals in the sample), we also
calculate marginal effects at the mean values of covariates and at different values of Cit . These
results are plotted in Figure 2.6. The figure shows the predicted probabilities of being in one of the
three employment states at different values of the CMA index. The results show a rise in the size
of the formal sector and a decline in the size of the informal sector, as the CMA improves. The
employment rate appears to be unaffected.
Table 2.5 presents the results of other variables that could be worth mentioning. Older indi-
viduals are less likely to be non-employed than work informally. Females have a much higher
likelihood of being non-employed and working formally than working informally. Ethnic Russian
tend to work in the formal sector. More educated individuals are more likely to work in the for-
mal sector and less likely to be non-employed. Time-varying variables appear as time-averaged
variables and as deviations from the mean. For example, non-employed individuals come from
low-consumption households (0.526), but an increase in consumption above the mean raises the
likelihood of being non-employed (1.068), and it can be interpreted as an income effect. Individu-
als have an increased risk of being non-employed with more children. Larger cities tend to have a
larger informal sector. These results are consistent with summary statistics by sector.
2.6.3 Robustness Analysis
The robustness analysis of the dynamic employment model of employment is presented in Ta-
ble 2.7. The table reports the results on the main variables from seven alternative specifications:
specification (1) excludes the unobserved individual heterogeneity and assumes exogenous initial
conditions; specification (2) includes the unobserved heterogeneity, but excludes time-averaged
variables and initial conditions; specification (3) uses the Heckman solution to the endogeneity
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of the initial conditions18; specification (4)19 includes additional controls such as the real regional
GDP per capita (in log), the regional unemployment rate, the 5-year moving average of the re-
gional inflation rate, the log of distance from the community center to the regional capital, and
a dummy for whether any state-owned enterprises were closed in the community in the last 12
months20; specification (5) excludes the city of Moscow21; specification (6) re-estimates equation
(2.17) on the sample of individuals who at time t did not plan to take a loan in the next 12 months;
specification (7) adds “leaving the survey at t+1” as a fourth possible individual outcome.
The robustness analysis supports the results of the main model presented in Table 2.5. Based
on these results, we can conclude that it is important to account for individual time-constant unob-
served heterogeneity, as the results change substantially. The assumption about the exogeneity of
the initial conditions could be a strong assumption22, the models that account for the endogeneity
of the initial conditions produce somewhat larger effects of the CMA on the size of the informal
and formal sectors, but the overall story is the same. The results show that there is no change from
using additional controls or excluding the city of Moscow. Furthermore, for the sample of individ-
uals who at time t did not plan to take a loan in the next 12 months, the effect of the CMA on the
formal and informal sector proportions is only slightly larger (by 0.1 ppt) than for the full sample.
Accounting for the survey exit does not make much difference to the main result but reduces the
computation time by almost 40 times. It is interesting that informal workers and the non-employed
have a lower likelihood of exiting the survey relative to staying in or switching to the informal
sector.
18The full Heckman estimates including equations for initial conditions with exclusion restrictions are shown in
Appendix
19 Specifications (4)-(7) use the WRS solution to the endogeneity of initial conditions and have the same set of
covariates as in Table 2.5.
20 The model is computationally time-consuming, and adding additional variables is costly in terms of time. We
are confident in the variable choice in our main specification but also check if the results change when additional
regional/community controls are added.
21 Almost 50 percent of countrys credit organizations and 10 percent of all bank offices are in Moscow. Given such
a large bank concentration in one city, we check if our results stay when we exclude Moscow respondents from the
sample.
22 The full exogenous initial conditions model estimates are shown in Appendix.
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The results show that the Heckman and WRS solutions to the endogeneity of the initial con-
ditions produce similar effects. The full Heckman estimates including equations for the initial
conditions with exclusion restrictions are shown in Appendix. This table also provides the results
of the model with exogenous initial conditions. Specification 1 assumes exogenous initial condi-
tions. The comparison of this specification with the WRS estimator in Table 2.5 shows that the
results on the interaction terms related to job switching are not that different. Some other coeffi-
cients, such as the age and household size, are statistically different although the direction of the
effect is the same between the two specifications. The results suggest that the exogeneity of the
initial conditions might be a strong assumption. Specification 2 provides results for the Heckman
specification. The comparison of this specification with the WRS specification in Table 2.5 shows
that the main results are very similar. An increase in the CMA index by one standard deviation
significantly increases the risk of staying in the formal sector compared to moving to the informal
sector. Similarly, for informal workers, the likelihood of finding a formal job goes up as Cit in-
creases. The only result that is different between the Heckman and the WRS estimators is the age
effect in the first outcome equation. In the WRS model, the age effect is flat, while in the Heckman
model, it is concave (increasing at first and then declining at a later age). Exclusion restrictions for
the first-period employment status are statistically significant. Predictably, we find that individuals
in regions with a larger government sector and a smaller informal sector are more likely to have a
formal job in the first period of their employment sequence. Recently closed SOEs in a community
increase the probability of being without a job. Individuals who went to high school in the regions
with above-than-average pay are more likely to work formally in the first period. But they are also
more likely to be non-employed than to have an informal job. This result is less intuitive and might
be due to the income effect on work incentives. Generally, we prefer the WRS solution since it
does not rely on having exclusion restrictions.
Another way to perform the robustness analysis is consideration of disaggregated employment
statuses. The lagged employment status at time t is disaggregated by splitting informal workers
at time t into the four subgroups. In all other ways, the two specifications in this table are the
same as in Table 2.5. For the communities with a mean zero credit market accessibility index, all
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groups of informal workers have a lower risk of moving to the formal sector relative to staying in
the informal sector. This relative risk is the lowest for the self-employed (0.111), followed by IEA
workers (0.168), those hired by a private person (0.184), and then unregistered employees (0.196).
It is interesting that the relative risk of losing a job is also the lowest for the self-employed (0.279),
which is consistent with results in Table 2.4. Similar to Table 2.5, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the credit market accessibility index raises the odds for formal sector workers to remain
in the same sector relative to switching to the informal sector23 by 1.229 times (or 23 percent).
The AME results show that all the subgroups in the informal sector demonstrate a large positive
effect of the CMA index on the probability of switching to a formal sector job in the next period.
The effect varies between 2.7 ppt for self-employed individuals and 5.5 ppt for IEA workers for
a one-unit increase in Cit. There is less heterogeneity in the negative effect of Cit on the proba-
bility of remaining in the informal sector. This probability declines by 3.4-4.9 ppt for every unit
increase in Cit. Finally, the likelihood of becoming non-employed is unaffected by the credit mar-
ket development for all the subgroups but the self-employed. This result is possible for several
reasons. First, it could be just an income effect. For example, receiving a loan by a household
member may reduce incentives of other members being engaged in self-employment. Second,
some self-employed workers may lose their job if more banks means more regulation and stronger
tax enforcement in the community. The puzzle here is why only the self-employed are affected,
but not the other groups.
Another possible definition of the informal labor status is based on the type of payment. Table
A.3 provides estimates for the payment type instead of the registration status. The payment type
has four categories: (1) only official pay, (2) partly unofficial pay, (3) entirely unofficial pay, and (4)
no job. IEA workers and individuals with no labor earnings in the last 30 days are excluded because
there is no information on their payment status. At a mean zero CMA index, workers with only
unofficial pay have significantly lower odds of moving to jobs with only official pay compared to
workers with partly unofficial pay (0.052 v. 0.491). However, these odds rise considerably when
23 The odds for formal sector workers to remain in the same sector relative to switching to the informal sector is
estimated by the following formula: Pr(Yi,t+1=N |Yi,t=F )Pr(Yi,t+1=I|Yi,t=F )
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the borrowing opportunities expand. The AME of Cit on the probability of receiving earnings
officially is positive for all four groups, but it is especially large for those who previously received
their earnings only unofficially, the so called envelope wages (6.8 ppt). With the credit market
development, the probability for this group to remain in the same status goes down by 4.2 ppt per
every unit increase in the index. It could be noted that workers with partly unofficial pay can still
get a loan based on the declared portion of their income. This could explain why the effect of the
CMA on the transition probabilities for this group is not so large as the one for workers with only
unofficial pay.
2.6.4 Policy Simulations
For policy simulations, we simulate separate components of the CMA index. Table A.5 pro-
vides results of the WRS model for different measures of the CMA. We replace the aggregate
index of the CMA by the vector of the index components. The disadvantage of this approach is
having too many interactions. This makes a direct interpretation of the relative risk ratios more dif-
ficult. Yet, the advantage of such replacement is the ability to simulate policies based on specific
indicators rather than on the index.
We report the summary results of four simulated policies in Table 2.10. Table 2.10 shows the
predicted probabilities of being in the formal and informal sectors before and after a given policy
is implemented. The predicted probability of being non-employed is 1 − P̂F − P̂I , and it is not
shown. The predicted probabilities are evaluated at the starting values indicated in the table and
at sample means of all other covariates. Thus, these are no AMEs across the sample, but there are
marginal effects at given values.
The first policy is opening a Sberbank office in a community that does not have any bank within
10 km. Based on the model estimates, we find a statistically significant increase in the size of the
formal sector from 63 percent to almost 65 percent as a result of this policy. The informal sector
falls by 1 ppt, and the share of jobless individuals falls by 0.9 ppt.
Now, suppose that instead of Sberbank, some other bank opens its office in a community where
no other bank operated previously. The effects of this policy are larger in magnitude. The estimates
predict a substantial decline in the share of the informal sector by 3.9 ppt. The formal sector
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expands by 2.9 ppt, but there is a negative spillover effect of the non-employment rising by 1
ppt. We have already mentioned a few reasons for why such side effects may occur. First, more
regulation and higher taxes raise costs for firms and may lead to job losses. Second, the credit
market development may generate additional income effects that may reduce work incentives.
The third policy is opening a second bank in a community that already has a Sberbank office.
We also find a substantial effect of bank competition on the size of the informal sector. For a
community where more than two banks operate, we change the regional number of banks per
10,000 from 2 to 3. This policy is also predicted to have a substantial effect on the employment
composition an increase in the share of the formal sector by 2 ppt and a decrease in the share of
the informal sector by 2.6 ppt.
Overall, policy simulations show a strong support for a reduction in the informal employment
in response to better CMA.
2.6.5 Effect of Credit Market Accessibility on Informal Sector
Table 2.11 shows the AMEs of the CMA on the size of the informal sector by subgroups of
individuals as well as the predicted mean size of the informal sector. The gender differences are
shown to motivate future research, as we find that males are not only more likely to work in the
informal sector, but they are also more responsive to changes in the CMA.
Other results intend to test one of the predictions of the theoretical model - the effect of lifting
credit constraints is larger for credit-constrained communities with lower levels of income. Al-
though these communities may have lower job opportunities in the formal sector, their informal
sector share is more responsive to the development of the credit market. The treatment effect is
estimated to be higher for regions with lower average earnings and a higher unemployment rate
and for communities with no banks and with a lower index of the CMA, as the theoretical model
predicts.
2.6.6 Loan Equation
In the Table 2.12, we provide the results for the household’s probability of taking a loan be-
tween time t and t+1 and for specific types of loans. Mortgage and auto loans require a collateral
such as a purchased car or a house. Consumer loans do not require a collateral, but they do require
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a proof of income. Both models are estimated on a sample of individuals who at time t did not
plan to take a loan in the next 12 months. An increase in the CMA index by one standard deviation
raises the likelihood of obtaining a loan by 3.5 ppt or by 1.32 times using the ratio of odds. Mort-
gage and auto loans are less responsive to the availability of bank services compared to consumer
loans. Opening a bank office in a community does not immediately qualify potential borrowers
for a mortgage or a car loan. The decision on a house or car purchase is more deliberate, requires
more efforts, preparation of documents, and is time consuming, and the distance to the nearest
bank might be a less important consideration for potential borrowers in this case.
Informal sector workers and people without a job are less likely to receive a loan relative to
formal sector workers. This supports the hypothesis that the probability of obtaining a loan is
expected to be higher for formal sector workers than for the other two groups. The relative risk
ratio is 0.842 and 0.642 for informal sector workers and the non-employed, respectively. Informal
sector workers have a much lower likelihood of obtaining a mortgage and a car loan compared to
a consumer loan, which is expected.
Among other expected results, it should be mentioned that the likelihood of receiving a loan
is higher for females, ethnic Russians, married individuals, living in households with more kids,
and households with higher levels of consumption. Younger people have higher chances of ob-
taining a consumer loan, maybe because many older people were not used to taking loans in the
past economic system and often borrowed from each other. Other interesting results are as fol-
lows: the gender does not matter for mortgage and car loans; more educated individuals have an
increased risk of taking a mortgage and auto loan by 3.5 percent, but a decreased risk of taking
a consumer loan by 7 percent; the household size matters for mortgage and car loans but not for
consumer loans; the situation is opposite with the number of kids having more kids does not
increase the likelihood of mortgages and car loans but improves the odds of obtaining consumer
loans. The results show a lower probability of taking a consumer loan in more populated area. It
can be explained by higher competition among borrowers. But it could also be that people in more
populated communities are less credit constrained and can buy goods and services directly without
borrowing.
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Table A.6 provides the results for loan equations with alternative definitions of the head of a
household: (1) a random household member, (2) the oldest male or oldest female if there are no
males in the household, and (3) the highest earning member of the household. No matter how we
choose the head of the household, the risk of taking a loan increases when the CMA improves,
and it is significantly lower for informal sector workers and the non-employed compared to formal
sector workers.
2.7 Conclusions
The study investigates a novel mechanism of reducing the labor informality through the devel-
opment of the credit market. In this paper, we provide a simple two period theoretical model and
an empirical estimation of the link between the credit market development and the labor mobility
among three labor market states (informal sector, formal sector and non-employment). The theo-
retical model shows that the credit market development associated with a reduction in interest costs
and non-interest costs of borrowing increases the share of formal employment, and the empirical
work tests this evidence.
The main empirical method is the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment with cor-
related random effects. Two main issues arise in the estimation of this class of dynamic models
with correlated random effects. The first one is the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables. To allow for such correlation, we follow the literature by adding
the Mundlak-Chamberlain device or the longitudinal average of time-varying explanatory vari-
ables. The second issue is the initial conditions problem that stems from the correlation between
the error term and the initial observation for the employment status. Endogenous initial conditions
require a specification of the conditional distribution for the initial employment status. In the lit-
erature, there are two common approaches to specifying this distribution: Heckman (1981), and
Wooldridge (2005) and Rabe-Hesketh and Scrondal (2013). The paper estimates and compares
both solutions to the initial conditions problem.
The paper shows that the probability that informal workers would switch to formal jobs is
higher for borrowers than for non-borrowers. Furthermore, a relaxation of credit constraints in-
creases the probability of transition from an informal to a formal job. These results are robust in
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different specifications of the model. Policy simulations show a strong support for a reduction in





Figure 2.2: Share of Loan-Taking Households
Notes. The 95 percent confidence interval is shown in grey.
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Figure 2.3: Distance to the Nearest Bank Office
Notes. In both panels, the distance to the nearest Sberbank office is depicted in blue, while the distance to
the nearest office of other banks is shown in red. The distance measures are conditioned on being non-zero.
The sample average with zero values included is presented in Table 3. In Panel A, each distance is averaged
by year, and the 95 percent confidence interval is plotted in grey. In Panel B, dots represent region-year
observations. Each distance is averaged by region-year. The log scale is used for better data visualization.
The variable on the x-axis shows the regional share of loan-taking households. The solid line is a fitted line.
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Figure 2.4: Measure of formal credit market accessibility
The In panel A, the blue line shows the distance from the community with no bank services to any bank,
including Sberbank; the red line shows the distance from the community with only Sberbank to any other
bank excluding Sberbank. In panel B, the red line is a fitted line. In panel C, the red line indicates the
beginning of the Sberbank reformatting policy of its branch network. In panel D, the blue color indicates
points before the reformatting policy is implemented in 2010, the red color dots indicate points after 2010.
In panel E, the red line indicates the annual inflation rate and the blue line indicates the nominal interest
rate. In panel F, the red line is a fitted line.
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Figure 2.5: Transition from the Informal to the Formal Sector Before and After Taking a Loan
Notes. Each dot pertains to the predicted probability of the transition from the informal to the formal sector
from an event-study analysis. Panel A depicts the pre dicted rate of entry of informal workers to the formal
sector as a share of formal workers in t. Panel B plots the predicted switching probability of informal
workers in t-1 to become formal next year. Event time is defined as year when the household obtains the
first loan observed in the data. The probability model is linear and controls for each year before and after
the event (the categorical timeline), a quartic polynomial of current age, and calendar year fixed effects.
The plotted dots are the coefficients on the timeline variable plus the average predicted share evaluated at
timeline=0 (which is the omitted category). The sample is extended to earlier years 2002-2005 to capture as
many pre-event points as available, but it is restricted to individuals with non-missing employment status in
two consecutive years. Only 5 points before and after the event are shown.
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Figure 2.6: The Effect of Credit Market Accessibility on Employment Composition
Notes. Figure shows the predicted probabilities of being in one of the three employment states at different
values of the credit market accessibility index. The index is standardized to have zero mean and a standard
deviation of one. Predictions are obtained at sample means of covariates and based on the WRS model
reported in Table 5. The standard errors are estimated using the delta method. The 95 percent confidence
interval is also shown at each point estimate.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Trends in Employment Status
Mean 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Formal job 0.62 0.62 0.645 0.628 0.609 0.61 0.614
Informal worker 0.168 0.165 0.149 0.151 0.179 0.18 0.18
Unregistered employee 0.042 0.046 0.036 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.048
Self-employed 0.024 0.019 0.026 0.023 0.025 0.026
Works for a private person 0.046 0.034 0.036 0.042 0.056 0.057
IEA worker 0.051 0.064 0.051 0.044 0.053 0.049 0.057
Unknown 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
No job 0.212 0.215 0.206 0.221 0.212 0.21 0.207
Number of observations (109,957) (8,247) (7,879) (12,044) (12,362) (9,920) (9,730)
Formal pay only 0.825 0.842 0.83 0.851 0.835 0.799
Some unofficial pay 0.107 0.111 0.116 0.093 0.096 0.101
Unofficial pay only 0.068 0.048 0.054 0.056 0.069 0.101
Number of observations (57,243) (4,395) (7,033) (7,289) (6,006) (7,103)
Notes. Table shows the composition of the surveyed population of age 20-59 for all available years
combined starting with 2006 (column 1) and separately for every other survey year. The definition
of each status is provided in Appendix.
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RLMS, 2006-2016, age 20-59 115,521
Less
Missing employment status in t 5,564 109,957
Missing employment status in t+1 29,496 80,461
Missing information on explanatory
variables
193 80,268
Only one valid observation person 3,816 76,452
Notes. The main estimation sample has 76,367 person-year observations. Some estimation sam-
ples may have a smaller number of observations due to additional sample constraints.
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Age 39.706 38.208 40.67
(10.555) (10.749) (13.402)
Female (binary) 0.532 0.414 0.658
Russian ethnicity (binary) 0.884 0.788 0.803
Parents education
Lower levels 0.474 0.528 0.565
Upper vocational 0.247 0.211 0.198
Higher education 0.199 0.171 0.168
Missing 0.079 0.09 0.068
Years of schooling 12.391 11.203 11.081
(2.282) (2.196) (2.421)
Married (binary) 0.622 0.527 0.523
Number of HH members 3.44 3.749 3.719
(1.433) (1.77) (1.86)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13 0.607 0.65 0.584
(0.782) (0.853) (0.878)
Real HH non-durable consumption 44.976 43.256 37.077
(2016 thousand rubles) (37.833) (38.378) (36.035)
Community population (thousand people) 1241.568 909.508 1105.286
(3035.108) (2551.442) (2962.707)
Urban (binary) 0.765 0.657 0.633
Interval between interviews (days) 363.929 364.416 363.935n
(26.116) (24.702) (25.192)
Estimation sample [47,468] [12,732] [16,252]
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Regional earnings at age 17 relative to -0.053 -0.105 -0.103
country mean, log difference (0.225) (0.244) (0.268)
Government sector size, % of employment 30.825 30.601 30.859n
(4.335) (4.12) (4.315)
Informal sector size, % of employment 18.322 21.166 20.903
(8.008) (9.238) (9.853)
Any SOEs closed last 12 months? (binary) 0.202 0.201n 0.214n
Initial conditions sample (t=1) [9,106] [2,468] [3,573]
Credit market accessibility index 0.096 -0.187 -0.238
Bank presence in the community (0.902) (1.137) (1.14)
No banks 0.139 0.231 0.254
Only Sberbank 0.065 0.068n 0.074
Other banks 0.796 0.701 0.672
Distance to the nearest Sberbank office, km 2.731 5.463 5.38
(8.71) (12.124) (11.397)
Distance to the nearest other bank office, km 5.592 9.135 9.724
(9.135) (9.724) (13.732)
Number of bank offices per 1000 population 0.209 0.198 0.199
(0.198) (0.199) (0.061)
Estimation sample [47,468] [12,732] [16,252]
Notes. This table shows the mean and standard deviations of variables used in the empirical
analysis. The standard deviations of binary variables are not reported. The number of observations
is in brackets. The definition of each variable is provided in Appendix 1. HH denotes household.
All unconditional differences between formal and informal workers and between formal employees
and the non-employed are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, except for the estimates
marked with a superscript n.
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Table 2.4: Average Transition Probabilities for Borrowers and Non-Borrowers
Status j in t





[t, t+1] [t, t+1] [t, t+1] [t, t+1]
t∈[2006-2015]
Formal job 0.9 0.891 0.036 0.054
Informal job 0.287 0.216 0.121 0.161
No job 0.199 0.131 0.655 0.741
Number of observations (12,124) (35,455) (2,588) (13,456)
t ∈[2006-2013]
Unregistered employee 0.361 0.322 0.091 0.129
Self-employed 0.186 0.175 0.062 0.057
Works for a private person 0.279 0.253 0.076 0.107
IEA worker 0.288 0.151 0.248 0.293
Number of observations (10,566) (27,503) (2,228) (10,585)
Notes. This table shows the average annual probabilities of (i) transitioning from status j at time
t to the formal sector in t+1, PjF and (ii) exiting from employment between t and t+1, PjN . The
probability of staying in or switching to informal job is 1− PjF − PjN (not shown). The transition
probabilities are calculated separately for borrowers and non-borrowers, which are defined based
on the survey question asked in t+1: Did any of household members take a loan in the last 12
months? Sample is limited to prime-age individuals (age 20-59). The definition of each status is
provided in Appendix 1.
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Credit market accessibility index -0.022 1.253*** 1.157***
(1.010) (0.061) (0.063)
Informal job, t 0.167 0.155*** 0.695***
(0.373) (0.009) (0.044)
No job, t 0.213 0.169*** 2.801***
(0.409) (0.010) (0.177)
(Informal job, t) x Cit -0.031 1.215*** 0.968
(0.469) (0.053) (0.046)
(No job, t) x Cit -0.051 1.228*** 1.119**
(0.534) (0.056) (0.052)
Control variables,X̃i, Xit
Age, t 39.661 0.997 0.739***
(11.277) (0.016) (0.013)
Age squared, t 17.002 1.002 1.549***
(9.032) (0.020) (0.034)
Female 0.539 1.503*** 2.699***
(0.498) (0.071) (0.136)
Russian ethnicity 0.850 1.462*** 1.078
(0.357) (0.096) (0.074)
Parents education
Upper vocational 0.231 1.013 1.142**
(0.421) (0.061) (0.074)
Higher education 0.188 0.982 1.279***
(0.391) (0.067) (0.095)
Missing 0.079 0.685*** 0.750***
(0.269) (0.065) (0.077)
Years of schooling, t 11.914 1.127*** 0.928**
(2.378) (0.037) (0.035)
Married, t 0.585 1.148* 1.115
(0.493) (0.096) (0.105)
Number of HH members, t 3.551 1.005 0.968
(1.598) (0.028) (0.030)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13, t 0.609 1.014 1.114**
(0.816) (0.049) (0.058)
Real HH non-durable consumption, 3.507 0.996 1.065
log, t (0.722) (0.038) (0.042)
Community population, log 4.213 0.928*** 0.963**
(2.939) (0.014) (0.015)
Urban 0.719 0.994 0.918
(0.449) (0.094) (0.092)







Years of schooling 11.952 1.292*** 1.008
(2.353) (0.052) (0.041)
Married 0.590 1.112 1.069
(0.465) (0.118) (0.128)
Number of HH members 3.542 0.963 1.272***
(1.509) (0.037) (0.053)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13 0.610 1.052 0.927
(0.754) (0.070) (0.067)
Real HH consumption, log 3.521 1.074 0.526***
(0.609) (0.070) (0.035)
Initial conditions, Yi1 and Xi1
Informal job 0.165 0.067*** 0.302***
(0.371) (0.005) (0.025)
No job 0.223 0.204*** 2.377***
(0.416) (0.016) (0.197)
Years of schooling 11.760 0.804*** 1.047
(2.331) (0.027) (0.040)
Married 0.568 1.064 1.094
(0.495) (0.095) (0.105)
Number of HH members 3.599 0.977 0.932**
(1.499) (0.030) (0.030)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13 0.623 0.955 0.889**
(0.785) (0.050) (0.049)
Real HH consumption, log 3.411 0.947 1.097**
(0.789) (0.040) (0.047)






Notes. N=76,452. Table presents the relative risk ratios from the dynamic multinomial logit model of
employment with unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is employment status in t+1, with the
informal status chosen as the base outcome. Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of variables
in the estimation sample. Columns 2 and 3 present the full estimates of equation (8) with correlated random
effects and using the WRS solution to the endogeneity of initial conditions. The following variables are
included but not shown: year dummies, seven federal districts, fixed effects for the first year of the stochastic
process, and the intercept. The omitted category of parents education is general secondary education or
below. Robust standard errors clustered by individual id are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Variables without subscript t are time-constant. The average marginal effects are calculated across
individuals in the estimation sample.
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Table 2.6: Post-estimation predictions: Average marginal effect of Cit
Employment status in t+1
Formal job Informal job No job
Sector size in t+1 0.023 -0.021 -0.002
Transition probability
Ft → 0.017 -0.015 -0.002
It → 0.054 -0.039 -0.014
Ot → 0.054 -0.036 -0.002
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Table 2.7: Robustness Analysis of the Dynamic Employment Model with Unobserved Heterogene-
ity
Reduced-form (1) Exogenous initial conditions (2) Heckman estimator (3)
WRS estimator,
additional controls (4)
Formal, t+1 No job, t+1 Formal, t+1 Formal, t+1 No job, t+1 No job, t+1 Formal, t+1 No job, t+1
Credit market accessibility index, 1.106*** 1.025 1.182*** 1.078 1.284*** 1.137** 1.276*** 1.213***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.051) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.070)
(Informal job, t) 0.029*** 0.309*** 0.055*** 0.595*** 0.155*** 0.694*** 0.155*** 0.693***
(0.001) (0.014) (0.004) (0.039) (0.009) (0.042) (0.009) (0.044)
No job, t 0.081*** 5.681*** 0.078*** 4.499*** 0.178*** 2.775*** 0.168*** 2.762***
(0.003) (0.246) (0.004) (0.255) (0.010) (0.170) (0.010) (0.175)
(Informal job, t) x C 1.202*** 0.958 1.213*** 0.950 1.215*** 0.966 1.210*** 0.969
(0.048) (0.038) (0.057) (0.045) (0.053) (0.046) (0.053) (0.046)
(No job, t) x C 1.282*** 1.204*** 1.271*** 1.180*** 1.243*** 1.115** 1.230*** 1.129***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052) (0.057) (0.052)
N 76,452 76,452 76,452 76,452 76,452 76,452 76,452 76,452
WRS estimator, WRS estimator, WRS estimator, adjusted for
exclude Moscow (5) no loan intention (6) panel attrition (7)
Formal, t+1 No job, t+1 Formal, t+1 No job, t+1 Formal, t+1 No job, t+1 Survey exit,
t+1
Credit market accessibility index, 1.246*** 1.164*** 1.291*** 1.180*** 1.235*** 1.128** 1.139***
(0.061) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056)
(Informal job, t) 0.155*** 0.703*** 0.129*** 0.673*** 0.143*** 0.695*** 0.321***
(0.009) (0.046) (0.008) (0.044) (0.008) (0.042) (0.020)
No job, t 0.171*** 2.916*** 0.150*** 2.969*** 0.160*** 2.959*** 0.659***
(0.011) (0.193) (0.009) (0.193) (0.009) (0.179) (0.042)
(Informal job, t) x C 1.217*** 0.972 1.178*** 0.931 1.234*** 0.981 1.023
(0.056) (0.048) (0.053) (0.046) (0.052) (0.044) (0.047)
(No job, t) x C 1.230*** 1.146*** 1.201*** 1.099** 1.249*** 1.133*** 1.027
(0.059) (0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.048)
N 71,069 71,069 69,280 69,280 86,359 86,359 86,359
Notes. Table reports the relative risk of the transition between the employment states from t to t+1 associated with local credit market accessibility. It shows the results on select variables from
seven alternative specifications of the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment. Specification (1) excludes unobserved individual heterogeneity and assumes exogenous initial conditions.
Specification (2) includes unobserved heterogeneity but excludes time-averaged variables and initial conditions. Specification (3) uses the Heckman solution to the endogeneity of initial conditions.
The full Heckman estimates including equations for initial conditions with exclusion restrictions are shown in Appendix Table A2.1. Specifications (4)-(7) use the WRS solution to the endogeneity
of initial conditions and have the same set of covariates as in Table 5. Specification (4) includes additional controls such as real regional GDP per capita (in log), the regional unemployment rate,
the 5-year moving average of the regional inflation rate, the log of distance from the community center to the regional capital, and a dummy for whether any state-owned enterprises were closed in
the community in the last 12 months. Specification (5) excludes the city of Moscow. Specification (6) re-estimates equation (8) on the sample of individuals who at time t did not plan to take a loan
in the next 12 months. Specification (7) adds leaving the survey in t+1 as a fourth possible individual outcome. Working informally in t+1 is the base outcome in all models. Robust standard errors
clustered by individual id are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.8: Dynamic Employment Model with Disaggregated Groups of Informal Workers
WRS estimator (2)
Formal job, t+1 No job, t+1
Credit market accessibility index, 1.229*** 1.136**
(0.062) (0.064)
Employment status, t




Works for a private person 0.184*** 0.436***
(0.015) (0.042)
IEA worker 0.168*** 1.362***
(0.015) (0.117)
No job 0.176*** 2.927***
(0.011) (0.197)
(Employment status, t) x Cit
(Unregistered employee, t) x Cit 1.103 1.087
(0.094) (0.107)
(Self-employed, t) x Cit 1.117 1.372
(0.161) (0.276)
(Works for a private person, t) x Cit 1.178** 1.100
(0.081) (0.087)
(IEA worker, t) x Cit 1.379*** 1.164***
(0.089) (0.067)
(No job, t) x Cit 1.234*** 1.152***
(0.059) (0.054)
Notes. N=68,057. The sample is restricted to 2006-2014 years Table reports the relative risk of
the transition between the employment states from t to t+1 associated with local credit market
accessibility. The dependent variable is employment status in t+1, with the informal status chosen
as the base outcome. The lagged employment status at time t is disaggregated by splitting informal
workers at time t into the four subgroups. In all other ways, the two specifications in this table are
the same as in Table 5. Table shows the estimates of equation (8) with correlated random effects
and implements the WRS solution to the endogeneity of initial conditions. To save space, we only
show the results for the two-way interaction between the disaggregated employment status and
the index of credit market accessibility. Robust standard errors clustered by individual id are in
parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.9: Post-estimation predictions: Average marginal effect of Cit on transition probability




Disaggregated employment status in t
Registered employee 0.016 -0.014 -0.002
Unregistered employee 0.031 -0.034 0.002
Self-employed 0.027 -0.049 0.022
Works for a private person 0.041 -0.041 0.000
IEA worker 0.055 -0.049 -0.006
No job 0.035 -0.036 0.000
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Table 2.10: Predicted Probabilities from Simulated Policies
Formal, Formal, Informal, Informal, Change in
before after before after informal sector
Distance to the nearest Sberbank office
Policy 1: open a Sberbank office if no banks within 10 km 0.630 0.649 0.142 0.132 -0.010
Starting at 10 km for communities with no banks (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015)
Distance to the nearest other bank
Policy 2: open a bank office other than Sberbank if no banks within 10 km 0.626 0.655 0.160 0.121 -0.039
Starting at 10 km for communities with no other bank (0.016) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015)
Policy 3: open a second bank office 0.629 0.656 0.154 0.116 -0.038
Starting at 10 km for communities with only Sberbank (0.011) (0.024) (0.009) (0.016)
N of bank offices in region
Policy 4: increase to 3 offices per 10,000 for communities with 2+ banks 0.624 0.644 0.177 0.151 -0.026
Starting at 2 offices per 10,000 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Notes. : Table shows the predicted probabilities of being in the formal and informal sectors before
and after a given policy is implemented. The predicted probability of being non-employed is
1 − P̂F − P̂I (not shown). The marginal effects of policies on the employment composition are
predicted based on the WRS model estimates shown in Table A2.3. Predicted probabilities are
evaluated at the starting values indicated in the table and at sample means of all other covariates.
The standard errors are estimated using the delta method and reported in parentheses. The last
column shows the change in the relative size of the informal sector due to a simulated policy.
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Table 2.11: Heterogeneous Effects of Credit Market Accessibility on the Informal Sector
d (Informal) /dC The informal sector size
AME S.E. Mean S.E.
Female -0.018 (0.003) 0.122 (0.003)
Male -0.025 (0.004) 0.211 (0.002)
Real regional average labor earnings, t
Lowest tertile -0.024 (0.003) 0.195 (0.002)
Highest tertile -0.020 (0.003) 0.138 (0.002)
Regional unemployment rate, t
Highest tertile -0.023 (0.003) 0.193 (0.002)
Lowest tertile -0.019 (0.003) 0.134 (0.002)
Credit market accessibility index, t
Lowest tertile -0.024 (0.003) 0.195 (0.003)
Highest tertile -0.021 (0.003) 0.151 (0.002)
Bank availability, t
No banks -0.025 (0.004) 0.222 (0.004)
Only Sberbank -0.021 (0.003) 0.163 (0.004)
Other banks -0.021 (0.003) 0.149 (0.002)
Notes. : N=76,452. Based on the WRS estimates shown in Table 5, Table 9 reports the average
marginal effect of credit market accessibility on the size of the informal sector, d (Informal) /dC,
and the mean size of the informal sector by subgroups. Predicted marginal effects are averaged
across individuals in a subgroup. The standard errors are estimated using the delta method and
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.12: Heterogeneous Effects of Credit Market Accessibility on the Informal Sector
Logit Multinomial logit
Took a loan
Mortgage and auto loan Consumer loan
(t, t+1)
Credit market accessibility index, 1.318*** 1.170*** 1.366***
(0.050) (0.067) (0.057)
Informal job, t 0.842*** 0.739*** 0.868***
(0.039) (0.058) (0.044)
No job, t 0.642*** 0.645*** 0.629***
(0.031) (0.052) (0.034)
Age, t 0.962*** 0.988 0.956***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013)
Age squared, t 1.023 0.979 1.034*
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018)
Female 1.128*** 0.948 1.193***
(0.043) (0.054) (0.051)
Russian ethnicity 1.152** 0.938 1.235***
(0.068) (0.078) (0.083)
Parents education
Upper vocational 0.982 1.058 0.964
(0.048) (0.075) (0.053)
Higher education 0.851*** 0.825** 0.858**
(0.047) (0.067) (0.053)
Missing 0.908 0.912 0.915
(0.060) (0.095) (0.068)
Years of schooling, t 0.956*** 1.035*** 0.930***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
Married, t 1.125*** 1.541*** 1.030
(0.044) (0.096) (0.045)
Number of HH members, t 1.026 1.079*** 1.012
(0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13, t 1.095*** 0.953 1.138***
(0.030) (0.041) (0.035)
Real HH non-durable consumption, log, t 1.449*** 1.985*** 1.322***
(0.040) (0.088) (0.041)
Community population, log 0.945*** 0.968* 0.938***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
Urban 0.897 0.848 0.913
(0.070) (0.101) (0.078)
Interval between interviews 0.999 0.999 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 41,867 41,739
Notes. : Column 1 presents the relative risk ratios from the random effects logit model for the households probability of taking a loan between time t and t+1. The specification corresponds to
equation (9). Columns 2-3 present the relative risk ratios from the multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is the type of loan, with no loan chosen as the base
outcome. Covariates are taken for a randomly chosen household member aged 20-59. The following variables are included but not shown: year dummies, seven federal districts, and the intercept.
The omitted categories are formal sector job for the employment status and general secondary education or below for parents education. Both models are estimated on the sample of individuals
who at time t did not plan to take a loan in the next 12 months. Robust standard errors clustered by household id are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Variables without
subscript t are time-constant.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1 Variables
Employment status. The three main types of employment status are (1) formal workers, (2)
informal workers, and (3) the non-employed. The following flow chart in Figure 6 is created to
help the reader to see the sequence of employment questions in the RLMS. The main screening
question determines the status of individuals at their primary work. Presently working individuals
include those who are either currently working or temporarily absent from work. These employed
individuals are further split into those who work at a firm (an enterprise or organization where
more than one person works) and those who work not at a firm. There are also individuals who
answered that they are currently not working but eventually admitted to being engaged in (and paid
for) some individual economic activity, such as sewing, taxi driving, babysitting, selling products
on the streets, etc. We consider them as part of informal workers.
Formal workers are defined as individuals who are working at a firm with one or more employ-
ees and who are officially registered at their primary job. Official registration is determined based
on the survey question Are you on a work roster, written work agreement, or work contract? Infor-
mal workers are comprised of (a) unregistered employees, (b) individuals who are not working at
an enterprise with more than one person; they could be self-employed or hired by a private person,
and (c) individuals who are engaged in individual economic activity (IEA). Among people who are
not working at an enterprise with more than one person, the distinction between the self-employed
and those hired by a private person can be made in the 2006-2014 surveys. Non-employed indi-
viduals include all individuals aged 20-59 without a job. They are not presently working, and they
are not engaged in IEA.
Informal pay. A categorical variable indicating the share of officially paid earnings: (1) only
official pay, (2) partly unofficial pay, and (3) entirely unofficial pay. The variable is created based
on the question asked in 2008-2016: What percent of earnings was received officially, that is, taxes
were paid?. This question was answered by individuals who are presently working, worked last
month at least one hour and received earnings last month.
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Age, female, year of survey. Self-explanatory.
Russian ethnicity. A binary indicator for Russian ethnicity.
Parents education. A categorical variable indicating the highest level of schooling completed
by a parent: [1] General secondary, lower vocational or less, [2] Upper vocational, [3] Higher
education or more, and [4] Unknown level of parents education. The first category is the base
category. The variable is constructed from two sources. The first source is the direct survey
question on parents education asked in 2006 and 2011 waves. The second source is the roster
files that match children and parents participating in the RLMS. The roster id allows to determine
parents schooling for children who resided with a parent in the same household in one or more
survey waves.
Years of schooling. Typical cumulative duration of the highest attained level of education at the
time of interview: 0 for no schooling, 4 years for primary general (grades 1-6), 8 years for incom-
plete secondary (grades 7-9), 9 years for some vocational without a secondary school diploma, 10
years for general secondary (grades 10-11) , 11 years for lower vocational with a secondary school
diploma, 13 years for upper vocational (technical schools), 15 years for higher education, and 18
years for a post-graduate degree.
Married. = 1 for legally married individuals (including those not living together) and 0 for
other categories including single, widowed, divorced, and living together without marriage.
Number of household members. Counts the number of household members who are presently
living in the same household. Calculated from the household roster file.
Number of kids per household. Counts the number of children under the age of 14 currently
residing in the same household. Calculated from the household roster file.
Real household non-durable consumption. The sum of household spending on non-durable
goods and services in the last 30 days. The variable is in 2016 prices, in thousand rubles. The
construction of this variable follows Gorodnichenko et al. (2010).
Community population. Number of people living in the community, in thousands. Population
in cities is taken from the 2010 Census. Population in villages is taken from the 2010 survey of
communities.
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Urban. =1 for residents of cities or townships (the settlement of urban type) and 0 for rural
residents. The variable is treated as time-constant because the number of urban-rural switchers is
very small, 0.3 percent of the estimation sample. I
nterval between interviews. Number of days between survey interviews. Calculated based on
the date of interview.
Federal districts. Set of dummies for living in one of the seven federal districts at the time of
interview. The districts are Central, Northwest, South, Volga, Urals, Siberia, and Far East.
First wave fixed effects. Set of dummies for the starting year of the stochastic sequence or the
year of entry to the estimation sample.
Real regional earnings at age 17. Average monthly earnings deflated in 2016 prices, in thou-
sand rubles. Available for 1980, 1985, and continuously 1990-2016. The minimum year for age
17 in the estimation sample is 1964. For the 1964-1979 period, regional earnings are imputed by
multiplying the national average earnings in each year and the 1980 ratio of regional earnings to
the national average, thus assuming the constant regional structure of earnings during the Brezhnev
period of the USSR. Missing values in 1981-1984 and 1986-1989 are filled by linear interpolation.
Such imputations for the Soviet period may not generate too much noise, as the economy was
barely changing and rather stagnant. In addition, we include a binary indicator for the cohorts that
reach age 17 before the start of market reforms in 1992. Source: Goskomstat Central Statistical
Database, 2017. Statistical Yearbook of Russia, Goskomstat (various years).
Real regional earnings. Taken from the same series as above.
Unemployment rate. Regional unemployment rate is measured in percent of the labor force
according to the standard definition of the International Labor Organization. Source: Goskomstat
Central Statistical Database, 2017.
Regional size of government sector, %. Percent share of regional employment in state-owned
and municipally-owned enterprises. Source: Goskomstat Central Statistical Database, 2017.
Regional size of informal sector, %. Percent share of regional employment in the informal
sector. Source: (The Population Survey on Employment Issues), Goskomstat, various years.
Any SOEs closed in the community? A binary indicator for whether any state-owned enterprises
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were closed in the community during the last 12 months.
Household took a loan. =1 if any of household members took a loan in the last 12 months and
0 if no loan is taken.
Individual plan to obtain a loan. =1 if the respondent plans to borrow money from a bank in
the next 12 months and 0 if the respondent does not have such plans. Presence of banks in the
community. This categorical variable takes the value of 1 if no banks, 2 if only Sberbank, and 3
if other banks operate in the community. The third category is the base category. The variable
is constructed based on the following two questions from the survey of RLMS communities: Are
there branch offices of any banks, including Sberbank? and Are there branch offices of any banks
other than Sberbank? Distance to the nearest bank, km. The distance to the nearest bank is reported
for the communities with no banks and for the communities with only Sberbank. If the community
has a bank or bank office which does not belong to Sberbank, the distance is coded as zero. To avoid
mixing the distances for the first two groups of communities, we create two separate variables by
interacting the distance measure with dummies for each group: (1) distance from the community
with no banks to the nearest bank and (2) distance from the community with only Sberbank to
the nearest other bank. From this module, we use three questions: Are there offices of any banks,
including Sberbank?, Are there offices of any banks other than Sberbank?, and How far is it to
the nearest bank or bank office, in km?. Number of bank offices per 1,000 regional population.
The number of bank offices includes bank headquarters, subsidiary credit organizations, branches,
supplementary offices, and operational offices, but excludes cash offices, cash desks, and mobile















1 2 3 4 5 6
Credit market accessibility index 1.182*** 1.078 1.284*** 1.137**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062)
(Informal job, t) 0.055*** 0.595*** 0.155*** 0.694***
(0.004) (0.039) (0.009) (0.042)
No job, t 0.078*** 4.499*** 0.178*** 2.775***
(0.004) (0.255) (0.010) (0.170)
(Informal job, t) x C 1.213*** 0.950 1.215*** 0.966
(0.057) (0.045) (0.053) (0.046)
(No job, t) x C 1.271*** 1.180*** 1.243*** 1.115**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052)
Age, t 0.940*** 0.753*** 1.035** 0.676*** 1.125*** 0.618***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.016)
Age squared, t 1.085*** 1.503*** 0.958** 1.737*** 0.870*** 1.891***
(0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.039) (0.028) (0.064)
Female 1.578*** 2.696*** 1.568*** 3.670*** 1.491*** 4.081***
(0.062) (0.121) (0.080) (0.199) (0.106) (0.315)
Russian ethnicity 1.503*** 1.122* 1.976*** 1.065 2.265*** 0.956
(0.082) (0.068) (0.145) (0.077) (0.240) (0.102)
Parents education
Upper vocational 1.040 1.123** 1.004 1.141* 0.954 1.189*
(0.051) (0.064) (0.065) (0.077) (0.090) (0.118)
Higher education 1.008 1.239*** 0.952 1.348*** 0.888 1.608***
(0.057) (0.079) (0.070) (0.104) (0.093) (0.176)
Missing 0.726*** 0.750*** 0.834** 0.840** 0.861 0.881
(0.056) (0.066) (0.069) (0.075) (0.097) (0.106)
Years of schooling, t 1.170*** 0.988 1.296*** 0.952*** 1.365*** 0.968*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.017)
Married, t 1.357*** 1.228*** 1.414*** 1.191*** 1.719*** 1.190**
(0.052) (0.054) (0.068) (0.060) (0.128) (0.093)
Number of HH members, t 0.956*** 1.058*** 0.952*** 1.077*** 0.931** 1.114***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.033)
Number of kids per HH, 0-13, t 1.038 0.999 1.008 1.013 0.981 1.024
(0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.053) (0.058)
Real HH non-durable consumption, 1.023 0.854*** 1.053* 0.839*** 1.094* 0.666***
log, t (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.057) (0.037)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Community population, log 0.942*** 0.955*** 0.917*** 0.943*** 0.948** 0.966
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
Urban 0.958 0.941 1.017 0.858 1.129 0.774*
(0.075) (0.082) (0.102) (0.089) (0.155) (0.109)
Interval between interviews 1.001** 1.000 1.001** 1.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Relative regional earnings at age 17 1.534** 1.837***
(0.297) (0.380)
Regional size of government sector, % 1.053*** 1.005
(0.011) (0.012)
Regional size of the informal sector, % 0.963*** 0.993
(0.006) (0.007)
Any SOEs closed in the community? 1.001 1.165*
(0.083) (0.104)
Notes. N=76,452. Table presents the relative risk ratios from the dynamic multinomial logit model
of employment with unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is employment status in
t+1, with the informal status chosen as the base outcome. is the aggregate index based on the aver-
age of standardized z-scores. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of equation (8) with correlated
random effects, assuming the exogeneity of initial conditions. Columns 3-6 present the results of
the Heckman estimator described in Section 3. The following variables are included but not shown:
year dummies, seven federal districts, fixed effects for the first year of the stochastic process, and
the intercept. The omitted category of parents education is general secondary education or below.
Robust standard errors clustered by individual id are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Variables without subscript t are time-constant.
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Credit market accessibility index 1.370*** 0.896 1.322**
(0.147) (0.106) (0.147)
Type of pay, t
Some unofficial pay 0.491*** 2.448*** 0.964
(0.076) (0.400) (0.178)
Fully unofficial pay 0.052*** 0.171*** 0.246***
(0.009) (0.032) (0.041)
No job 0.174*** 0.272*** 3.919***
(0.023) (0.048) (0.533)
(Type of pay, t) x C
(Some unofficial pay, t) x C 0.901 0.943 0.935
(0.144) (0.151) (0.165)
(Fully unofficial pay, t) x C 1.385** 1.389* 1.065
(0.199) (0.236) (0.146)
(No job, t) x C 1.023 1.438*** 0.827**
(0.099) (0.197) (0.080)
Notes. N=44,696. The sample is restricted to 2008-2016 years Table reports the relative risk of the
transition between the payment types from t to t+1 associated with local credit market accessibility.
The dependent variable is the payment type in t+1, with four categories: (1) only official pay, (2)
partly unofficial pay, (3) entirely unofficial pay, and (4) no job. IEA workers and individuals
with no labor earnings in the last 30 days are excluded. The third category is chosen as the base
outcome. In all other ways, the specification is the same as in Table 5. To save space, we only show
the results for the two-way interaction between the payment type and the index of credit market
accessibility. Robust standard errors clustered by individual id are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Variables without subscript t are time-constant.
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Table A.4: Post-estimation predictions: Average marginal effect of Cit on transition probability








Payment status in t
Only official pay 0.023 -0.017 0.000 0.000
Partly unofficial pay 0.033 -0.036 0.000 0.000
Entirely unofficial pay 0.068 -0.016 0.000 0.000
No job 0.035 0.001 0.000 0.000
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Table A.5: Different Measures of Credit Market Accessibility
WRS estimator
Formal, t+1 No job, t+1
Type of community, t
No banks, t 0.991 1.262
(0.325) (0.499)
Only Sberbank, t 1.338 2.213*
(0.447) (0.921)
Employment status, t
Informal job, t 0.149*** 0.934
(0.024) (0.181)
No job, t 0.128*** 2.319***
(0.023) (0.427)
(Employment status, t) x (Type of community, t)
(Informal job, t) x (No banks, t) 3.436*** 1.336
(1.633) (0.662)
(No job, t) x (No banks, t) 2.079 1.845
(1.051) (0.944)
(Informal job, t) x (Only Sberbank, t) 1.842 0.668
(0.912) (0.366)
(No job, t) x (Only Sberbank, t) 1.439 0.829
(0.776) (0.442)
Distance to the nearest Sberbank office, log km 1.056 1.164
(0.096) (0.132)
(Informal job, t) x C 0.752*** 0.804
(0.080) (0.107)
(No job, t) x C 0.779* 0.747**
(0.112) (0.107)
Distance to the nearest other bank, log km 0.872 0.789**
(0.082) (0.093)
(Informal job, t) x C 0.763* 1.111
(0.107) (0.169)
(No job, t) x C 0.872 1.012
(0.135) (0.153)
N of operating credit organizations in region, log 20.745*** 20.283***
(12.580) (14.852)
(Informal job, t) x C 1.787 0.224*
(1.247) (0.192)
(No job, t) x C 5.518** 3.125
(4.324) (2.550)
Notes. N=76,452. Table reports the relative risk of the transition between the employment states from t to t+1 associated with different measures of local credit market accessibility. The
specification corresponds to equation (8) with correlated random effects and uses the WRS solution to the endogeneity of initial conditions. The dependent variable is employment status in t+1,
with the informal status chosen as the base outcome. The only difference from Table 5 is that the aggregate index of credit market accessibility is replaced by the vector of index components. All
other covariates are the same as in Table 5. We only show the results for two-way interaction between the lagged employment status and measures of credit market accessibility. Robust standard
errors clustered by individual id are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Variables without subscript t are time-constant.
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Table A.6: Different Measures of Credit Market Accessibility





Credit market accessibility index, 1.318*** 1.296*** 1.320***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051)
Informal job, t 0.842*** 0.863*** 0.867***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
No job, t 0.642*** 0.683*** 0.586***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.034)
Notes. N=41,867. Table presents the relative risk ratios from the random effects logit model for the house-
holds probability of taking a loan between time t and t+1. It shows the results on select variables. Each
column corresponds to one of the three definitions of the head of household: (1) a random household mem-
ber, (2) oldest male or oldest female if there are no males in household, and (3) a highest earning member of
household. The full model estimates for a random household member are shown in Table 10. The omitted
category is having a formal sector job for the employment status. All models are estimated on the sample of
individuals who at time t did not plan to take a loan in the next 12 months. Robust standard errors clustered
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